

KUSUMANJALI,

OR

THE HANDFUL OF FLOWERS.

FIRST CLUSTER.

I.—May this handful of flowers of faultless logic, devoted to the twofold proof* of God, delight my mind without hindrance while bee-like hovering over it,—this handful of flowers, opening under favourable auspices, and affording a banquet to the upright by the inhaling of its fragrance,—one which will not fade, however closely handled,—the home of a honey that distils the nectar of immortality.†

II.—“ But is there not an absence of evidence to establish any connection between such a fruit as liberation and your argument devoted to the twofold proof of the existence of God,—since the word *soul* which signifies that soul which is the object of the so-called essential knowledge,‡ merely means that individual soul which is the object of

* *I. e.* the arguments which establish his existence, and the discussion as to the validity of the premisses which becomes necessary if these are not accepted. The words may also mean ‘laid at the feet of God.’

† The latter half of this *śloka* (the former in the original) has a double meaning, as nearly every word has a technical or logical sense,—“this handful of flowers, which reveals the knowledge of true minor terms and affords a banquet to the intelligent by the perception of an undoubted universal connection [between the middle and major terms] &c.”—I may add that the proverb alluded to in the commentary *हृदिहितो भावो द्रव्यवत् प्रकाशते* is quoted to shew that though *rasa* properly denotes an attribute, it here means the subject which possesses it.

‡ Alluding to such passages as that in the *Bṛihadārany. Upanishad* (ii. 4, 5), ‘behold the soul (*âtma*) is verily to be seen, heard, contemplated and profoundly meditated upon.’

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the illusory knowledge that is the cause of the sensible world; and therefore the contemplating of *this* is the true means of liberation?"* To meet this doubt he replies,

II.—That Being, whose worship the wise consider as the means of the two heaven-like liberations,—He, the Supreme Soul, is here ascertained (as the object of our contemplation).

The 'two heaven-like liberations' [as intensely desirable from the absence of all pain,] are the liberation while still remaining in this life, and the absolute emancipation. The contemplation of God is a means of liberation through the merit produced thereby or through the knowledge of one's own soul. This S'ruti† is the proof that it is such a cause, 'having known him only one goes beyond death; there is no other path to obtain it.' And that the knowledge of one's own soul is the cause of liberation is proved by the s'ruti,‡ 'When a man truly discriminates the soul and says "I am he," what can he wish for? or in desire of what object can he follow the continuous onflow of mundane events?'

III.—Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four wellknown] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahá páś'upatas as the Independent one, undefiled by vaidic or secular violations,—the S'aivas as S'iva,—the Vaishnavas as Purushottoma,—the followers of the Puráṇas as the great Father (Brahmá),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatás as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mímáṇsakas as Him who is pointed out as

* This being the seat of the great error, it is to this that our contemplations should be directed.

† S'wetás'watara Upanishad, iii. 8.

‡ Bṛihadár. Up. iv. 4, 12.—S'ankara read सञ्चरेत् for संसरेत्.

to be worshipped,—the Chárvákas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyáya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Vis'wakarman,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable S'iva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c. how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?—Still this logical investigation may be well called the contemplation of God, and this is really worship when it follows the hearing the S'ruti. Therefore that adorable one who hath been often heard mentioned in the S'ruti, Smṛiti, narrative poems, Puráṇas, &c., must now be contemplated, according to such a S'ruti as 'He is to be heard and to be contemplated,' and such a Smṛiti as 'by the Veda, inference and the delight of continued meditation,—in this threefold manner producing knowledge, a man obtains the highest concentration.' Now there is, in short, a fivefold opposition to our theory,—as based, first, on the non-existence of any supernatural cause of another world (as *adṛishṭa*, the merit and demerit of our actions);—or secondly, on the possibility of our putting in action certain causes of another world (as sacrifices,) even if God be allowed to be non-existent;—or thirdly, on the existence of proofs which show the non-existence of God;—or fourthly, on the opinion that, even if God does exist, he cannot be a cause of true knowledge to us;—or fifthly, on the absence of any argument to prove his existence.

"Very"—without any second; "knower"—existing in the form of pure knowledge; "first wise"—existing in the form of intelligence at the first beginning of creation; "perfect"—as possessed of the eight divine faculties; ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence, are the five "pains," sacrifice, injuring others, &c.

as causing merit and demerit, are the "actions;" rank, length of life and enjoyment are the "fruits;" merit and demerit the "deserts" left as a residue in the mind. "Revealed"—*i. e.* manifested [as a previously existing object], since the Veda is eternal. He is "gracious" as being the original instructor in arts, as of making jars, &c. "Ś'iva," void of the three qualities; the "great Father" as the father even of the father; "omniscient" with a momentary omniscience.* The "obstructions" are ignorance, desire, aversion, delusion, and tenacity of mundane existence,— "pointed out as to be worshipped" as the Vaidic mantras, &c.—possessed of "all that is said worthy of him" in the various descriptions of God. "School" (*charaṇa*) means here recension (*s'ākhā*).† Although the existence of God is indeed established by the S'ruti's evidence, yet, if we wish to employ inference, the absence of doubt need not be a fault in our argument.‡ He therefore proceeds towards the close of the passage to propose a doubt, according to the principle of satisfying an opponent.

IV.—We have to meet the opponent's first objection by establishing the existence of a supernatural cause of another world in the form of merit and demerit, and, if this be established, then it follows that a God is established as the superintendent thereof, since a non-intelligent cause can only produce its effect by the superintendence of something intelligent. He therefore proceeds to establish this.

IV.—From dependence,—from eternity,—from diversity,—from universal practice,—and from the apportionment to each individual soul,—mundane enjoyment implies a supernatural cause [*i. e.* 'desert.']

Our proposition is that there exists a supernatural cause of another world, *i. e.* a cause beyond the reach of the senses. *a.* First of all, then, to establish the class of causes in general, he says "from dependence." Dependence means here that the effect is occasional. All effects must have a cause since they are occasional, like the gratification produc-

* The Mādhyamika Bauddhas hold that everything is momentary, *πάντα ῥεῖ*.

† For the original difference between *charaṇa* and *s'ākhā* cf. Müller's Ancient Sanskrit literature, p. 125. On *pravara*, see *ibid.*, p. 386.

‡ In ordinary cases people do not take the trouble of arguing if there is no doubt to be solved.

ed by food; [otherwise, if they did not depend on a cause, they could be found everywhere and always]. *b.* "But if the cause of a jar, &c. were eternal, would it not follow that the jar, &c. would also be eternal, and therefore we must assume the jar's cause to be itself only occasional, and therefore the perpetual series of causes must be all occasional, each dependent on its previous cause?" To meet this objection of a regressus in infinitum he says "from the eternity [of the succession of cause and effect]," like the continued series of seed and shoot,*—the meaning being that a regressus in infinitum ceases to be a fault, if, like this one alleged in our illustration, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses. *c.* "But [if you require a cause,] why not say [with the Vedāntin] that Brahma alone is the cause, or [with the Sāṅkhya] Nature in the form of various individual intellects?" To meet this, he says "from the diversity [of effects, as heaven, hell, &c.]"—as the effects imply a diversity of causes, from their being diverse as effects. *d.* "But why not accept a visible cause as sacrifices, &c.—why have recourse to an invisible desert (*adṛishṭa*)?" To meet this, he adds "from the universal practice," *i. e.* from the fact that all men, desiring fruit in another world, do engage in sacrifices, &c. It is only the conviction that they do produce heaven, &c. as their fruit, which makes men engage in sacrifices, &c.; and these [passing away when the action is over] cannot produce this fruit unless by means of some influence which continues to act after the rite is over,—and hence is this invisible influence, called merit or demerit, established. *e.* "But why not say that this desert does not reside in the same subject as the enjoyment [*i. e.* the individual soul,] but produces the enjoyment by abiding in the thing enjoyed?" He replies "from the apportionment to each soul." Since the enjoyment resides in each soul severally, we should be unwarranted to attribute its production to a desert residing elsewhere.

V.—"But why may we not suppose that the effect arises without a cause, according to the adversary's opinion given in the Nyāya Sūtras (iv. 22), 'there is an origination of entities from no cause, for we see the sharpness of a thorn, &c.?' " He replies,

* Cf. Cowper's remarks on his cucumber, "I raised the seed that produced the plant, that produced the fruit, that produced the seed, that produced the fruit I sent you."

V.—“Without a cause” cannot mean the denial of a cause or of production, nor can it imply that the effect itself or an unreal thing is the cause; and if you suggest “spontaneously,” it cannot mean *that*, from effects being definitely limited.

Does your “without a cause” mean that *a.* there is no cause at all? or *b.* does it deny all production? or *c.* does it imply the rejection of all foreign causes? or *d.* of all *real* causes? Under either pair of alternatives the ultimate result is that you have no cause at all, and, under the latter pair, the additional absurdity of a false cause.†—Or *e.* does it mean “spontaneously?” But effects are definitely limited, since, if they were not, occasionalness would be at an end, [as they might then arise always and everywhere.]

VI.—“But if we are to assume an eternal succession of causes and effects (as otherwise we cannot account for the occasionalness of effects,)—still even then, as that which is distinguished by the nature of fire (*scil.* fire) will not always be found only where straw, &c., are, these latter will have to be excluded from being causes, and therefore we shall again have our old difficulty of occasionalness being precluded, as no other cause can be mentioned.” Here the Mīmāṃsakas come in and maintain that we must assume as a cause the fact of there being present a capacity favourable to fire, and thus “capacity” must be allowed to be a separate category‡ varying according to each individual, non-eternal in the non-eternal thing, *described as it is in the line*

‘Eternal in the eternal, and in the non-eternal produced by the cause of that thing in which it resides.’

Or as another opinion holds [that of S’rīkarāchārya] “there is an eternal capacity favourable to fire, abiding in straw, the *araṇi* wood, and the burning gem.”—The Naiyāyikas however maintain that there is an actual difference of class which accompanies the being produced from straw, *araṇi* or the burning gem,—since, if we assumed a capacity favourable to one and the same thing (*i. e.* to fire,) and yet itself existing in things of different classes (as straw, &c.,) then on seeing

* That is, there can be imagined false causes.

† Under any one of the four cases you have really no proper ‘cause’ at all (thus in the third, the thing must precede itself to fulfil the definition of a cause;) and hence any supposed cause (as in *c.*, and *d.*,) can only be a false one.

‡ Cf. Śiddhānta Muktāvali, pp. 3, 4.

smoke, &c., you could not draw the inference of fire, &c.* And again, [if this assumption were correct], we should not have such respective colligations of concurrent causes of fire, as straw and blowing, *arāṇi* wood and rubbing, or the burning gem and the reflected rays of the sun, since we see in other cases that that which possesses the property that determines causation (*i. e.* according to the present theory, capacity) will produce its effect in conjunction with anything which similarly possesses some other property that determines causation; and therefore, in the present case, we should be led to expect fire to result from such a conjunction as the gem and blowing. If you would meet this by assuming that there is one capacity favourable to fire, which resides not in any one thing alone (as straw,) but in the several combinations, as straw and blowing, and the rest,—this is not the true solution, but you must rather accept (from its greater simplicity) my theory that a difference of class resides in the various fires produced by straw, &c., as is seen by the evidence of the senses, like the fire of a lamp, &c.† Hence Capacity is not to be assumed as a separate category. These discussions are condensed in the following couplet.

VI.—This succession of causes and effects has no beginning, nor has it one capacity abiding in things of different classes [as straw, &c.]; we must diligently strive for ourselves to fix the several limitations, by determining the constant accompaniments and separations.‡

The meaning of this is that we must assume a difference of class (*i. e.* species,) in effects produced by different causes. [If you ask “Then, in reference to *what* cause, is the class of fire (as the genus,) the determining notion of all the various special fires as effects, I reply,] heat as possessing a peculiar hot quality to the touch§ is the cause in the case of all the various fires. [In the case of the different species of fire

* Fire would not be the cause of smoke, in its nature as fire, but simply as having a capacity for producing smoke; and therefore on seeing smoke, our true inference would be that the mountain has not “fire” but “a capacity for producing smoke.”

† The fire in a lamp lights the house, while fire from wood or cow-dung produces little or no light.

‡ *E. g.* Fire may be found, and yet no straw, but a gem; and vice versa.

§ This epithet is added to exclude ‘gold.’

we have different causes, straw, &c., but in all alike we have the general cause 'heat,' *i. e.* heat is the necessary and universal antecedent].

VII.—“But may we not say that as one and the same lamp gives light, destroys the wick and illumines different objects as jars, &c., so we may have one common cause, either as the one Brahma (with the Vedāntin,) or as Nature (with the Sāṅkhya) which is not to be distinguished from the various intellects apportioned to the different souls, as the cause and effect are identical;—and hence the existence of God will not be established as the superintendent of merit and demerit, [since our supposed causes will evolve their own effects, and we therefore need not assume *adṛiṣṭa* as the special cause of the world]?”

To meet this he says,

VII.—Of *one* there can be no succession, of the *same* there can be no variety; it is not a special capacity since this cannot be severed,—nature is hard to be violated.

From one cause alone there can be no determinate *succession* of effects [as they would be all produced simultaneously;] and from the same cause, *i. e.* one general cause (as the Sāṅkhya's prakṛiti) there cannot be a variety of effects, *i. e.* effects of different kinds; and therefore since we find successive effects produced, we must conclude that there are successive causes, and, since we find effects of various kinds, we must conclude the causes to be likewise various in kind.

He now refutes the doubt that perhaps various effects might be produced from one general cause by special capacities, by the words “it is not a special capacity, since this cannot be severed” from the subject in which it resides, as the power and that which possesses the power are really identical; and if you sever them, then we shall have to accept the power as the true cause, and in this way your unity of cause is destroyed, and duality follows.—“May we not hold that one cause can produce various effects simply by its own nature?” He replies “nature is hard to be violated.” If that same nature which existed when one effect had to be produced, continued to exist at the time of the production of another, then the nature of water, &c., might exist in fire,—that is, a thing's real nature cannot remain concealed. The instance of the lamp is not in point, as it can be explained by a difference in the concurrent causes neces-

sary to produce the different effects.*

VIII. "But why may we not say that the potter's staff, &c. may be a cause in the case of jars, &c., but not sacrifices, &c. in the case of heaven, &c.?" He replies,

VIII. The universal practice is not fruitless, nor can it have trouble as its only fruit; nor can it have as its fruit some visible gain; nor can there be such a deception [as this would involve if all were false].

The activity in performing sacrifices to obtain heaven, which all display who desire another world, cannot be fruitless, nor can it have trouble as its sole result,—since activity arises only from a conviction that such a course will be a means to obtain the desired object. Nor can we say that its fruit is the attainment of some visible object, *i. e.*, reputation for sanctity, wealth, &c., since even those perform sacrifices who have no regard to such objects. Should you reply that some knave first devised the custom of offering sacrifices as means of obtaining heaven, and the rest of mankind were cajoled into following his example, this is met by the words "nor can there be such a deception." For who could be so utterly different from the rest of mankind as for the mere sake of deceiving others to impose upon himself a round of actions which necessarily cause all sorts of trouble? and hence we may safely infer that the universal practice of sacrifice is a proof that sacrifices do produce heaven as their result.

IX. "Well, then, why not say that sacrifices, &c., may be the direct causes of [our obtaining] heaven, &c., and not any merit which they are said to produce?" He replies,

IX. A thing long passed cannot produce its result without some continuant influence over and above. The souls, having no distinction, could not have enjoyment even though the objects were affected by *adrishṭa*.

* Thus for the giving light we have the conjunction of the flame and wick, &c.; for the burning of the wick we have the destruction of the conjunction previously existing between the particles of the wick; for the illuminating of objects we have the conjunction of the eye with the jar, and that of the jar with the light.

A "thing long passed," *i. e.* the sacrifice, &c., "without some continuant influence over and above," *i. e.* an operation favourable to producing the result, cannot produce that result; for a cause which has long ceased to be, can only act as a cause by means of some operation [or influence] that continues to exist after it, just as the transient perception of the senses only produces recollection by means of the impression which it leaves in the mind, [to produce the actual recollection we require some reminding association to arouse the dormant impression.]—"May we not say that *adrishṭa* may be the cause, as residing in the thing to be enjoyed [and not as merit in the person enjoying?]" He replies by the subsequent line. If the souls had no distinction, one from the other, in the form of different kinds of merit, they could not receive different degrees of enjoyment [as we see they do] from different bodies [higher or lower in the scale], even though these were affected by *adrishṭa*,—since these bodies are properly common to all souls. In other words, the varying enjoyment can only be produced by the different bodies and their organs as attracted, in each case, by the respective merit of the individual souls.

X. "But" [the *Mīmāṃsaka* will say,] "why not allow a certain imperceptible property [*i. e.* the before-mentioned capacity] residing in the objects to be enjoyed, which produces the enjoyment in each particular case, just as we accept a particular kind of capacity which abides in fire, &c., and produces their special effects, as burning, &c.? Otherwise [*i. e.*, if the fire burns of itself and not by its capacity,] we should have to expect the effect of burning to be produced wherever there was contact between the fire and the hand, even though the latter wore the fire-extinguishing gem. Nor may you say that the absence of this gem should be considered as also a cause of burning,—because causation must always imply presence and existence.* The true statement is that the gem produces the destruction of the burning capacity, and hence its common name 'the obstructor;' and hence we maintain that the category of Capacity must be accepted." He replies,

X. As existence, so too non-existence is held to be

* See *Jaimini Sūtras* i., *Mitāksharā* iii.

a cause as well as an effect; obstruction is the absence of means, and that which causes this is 'an obstructor.'

As we prove by constant accompaniment and separation that absence or non-existence (*abhāva*), *i. e.* emergent non-existence,* may be an effect, similarly we can prove that it may be a cause,—since there is no reason to establish such a maxim as yours, that 'causation must imply presence and existence.'—The second line replies to the objection that an inanimate thing cannot be said to be an obstructor. Obstruction (*pratibandha*) signifies "the absence of means," *i. e.* of causes to produce such and such an effect; and this in our present topic would be "the absence of the extinguishing gem's absence," *i. e.* the presence of the gem itself. Properly speaking the man who places the gem is the obstructor (*pratibandhaka*); but by the grammatical rule which allows the affix *ka* to be added pleonastically, we may accept *pratibandhaka* to be used for *pratibandha*, the 'obstructor' for the 'obstruction.'

The modern Mīmāṃsakas, however, maintain that "there is a needless complication in assuming such a cause as the absence of such a fire-extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of all [excitants as the fire-exciting gem, charms, &c.];† it is more simple to assume an eternal capacity in fire, &c., and, when the gem is present, this capacity is deadened. (Nor may you say that 'a capacity is first produced from the straw, &c. the causes of the fire,—this capacity resides in the fire, and is destroyed by the extinguishing gem and resuscitated by the exciting gem; and any objection on the ground of the indeterminate nature of the cause of the capacity‡ might be met by the assumption that its cause is only such a cause by virtue of itself possessing a capacity favourable for producing the former capacity.' This, we repeat, is unwarranted, because

* Emergent non-existence is the destruction of a thing previously existing. We prove that it is an effect because the destruction of a jar is only seen when it is preceded by some cause as the blow of a hammer, &c. and wherever these are not found, there the jar is not destroyed. The Mīmāṃsā holds that *abhāva*, being really nothing, cannot be a cause. But he proves that absence can be similarly shewn to be a cause,—where absence of the fire-extinguisher is, there is burning, and where there is not this absence, there is no burning.

† If the fire-extinguishing gem were present with the fire-exciting gem, its effect would be neutralised. Cf. Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 4.

‡ Its cause being sometimes straw, &c. and sometimes the exciting gem.

rather than assume such a multitude of successive capacities residing in the fire, it would be more simple to assume [with our opponents, the followers of the Nyáya,] that the one cause is the absence of such an extinguishing gem as is attended by the absence of a fire-exciting gem.) Therefore we maintain that in the case of burning we must assume, as the determining notion of causation, the presence of an undeadened capacity." Thus hold the modern Mímánsakas; but we cannot agree with them, because we should then have to assume an endless number of different capacities, as that of the extinguishing gem to cause the deadening of the burning capacity, that of the exciting gem to destroy the deadening, &c. This is a brief summary of the discussion.

XI. But the Mímánsakas reply, "In the Vaidic injunction 'he sprinkles the rice, he shells the rice,' do we not assume an operation or capacity [*i. e. samskāra*,] produced by the sprinkling, which abides in the rice and produces the future shelling, since what we understand by the expression is that only that rice which is sprinkled is capable of being shelled? and it may be taken as a general rule that whenever anything is done through desire of an effect which will reside in some other thing, the former produces an operation which produces the result residing in the latter, as is the case with sacrifices. [Sacrifices are done for the sake of happiness (as heaven, &c.) residing in the man; therefore the means thereto, the merit produced by the rite, must also reside in the man.] And again, unless we accept a continuant capacity, how can we account for rice, and rice only, being produced from sown rice, though the seed is dissolved in the ground into its component atoms? and similarly we must say that ploughing in the month Mággha (Jan.—Feb.) produces a capacity residing in the ground [which eventually produces a good harvest in Nov. and Dec.]" He answers,

XI. We accept an influence produced in man by such acts as sprinkling the rice, &c.* the qualities of the atoms, as form affected by contact with fire, &c., cause the distinction.

* Some say that there are three ways of sprinkling—*prokshana* with the supine hand, *abhyukshana* with the inverted hand, and *avokshana* by a motion of the hand sideways. But other authorities give them differently.

By sprinkling, &c. there is produced in man an influence which we call 'desert,'—since it is simpler to assume one single influence residing in the soul directly producing the shelling which is indirectly produced by sprinkling, &c.,* than to assume a variety of capacities for each parcel of rice,—and since some power or attribute must be assumed to be produced by a veda-commanded act which tends to a future result, as there is no visible means for the result being brought about. From the phrase "purified rice" we assume that the influence resides in the rice by a connection† which is the same as the nature of the thing [while it resides in the man by the so-called intimate relation;] and so too in the case of consecrated water, branches, &c. there is produced an influence or merit residing in the man favourable to producing such and such a result [as the consecration of the jar.] [Nor may you say that "if the merit produced do not reside in the rice but in the man, then why is *vrihā* in the objective case, as wherever there is this objective case we find the effect residing there, as in 'he cooks rice,'—here the effect produced by cooking, *i. e.*, softening, resides in the rice, &c."—as we reply that] your vaidic example stands on the same footing as such a common secular phrase as "he sprinkles the fried barley flour,"—here there is no Vaidic injunction, yet we find an objective case used, the real meaning of which is this, viz. the possessing a result produced by the action of another (*i. e.* the man), which result is the conjunction of the water produced by that action, *i. e.* the sprinkling. Besides your general maxim that 'whenever a thing is done through desire of an effect, &c.' fails in such cases as the hawk-sacrifice, which is performed for the sake of the slaughter of an enemy [which slaughter of course resides in him,] while it produces a result [hell] which resides in the performer.

* In other words *adrishā* is the *vyāpāra* of the sprinkling, according to the principle *taj-janyatve sati taj-janya-janako hi vyāpārah*.

† In Hindu philosophy there are three principal relations,—1. the *saṃavāya* or intimate relation, *i. e.* that which exists between the whole and its parts, a substance and its qualities, or both these and their genus; 2. the *sanyoga* or conjunction, as between a pot and the soil on which it stands; and 3. *swarūpa* or the nature of the thing. This last may be generally said to take up all those relations which are not included in the two former, such as the relation between an object and the knowledge of it (*vishayatā*), that between *abhāva* and the spot of ground from which the absent thing is absent, &c., and that between a distinguishing attribute (not a proper quality or action) and its subject, as *ākāś'atwa* in *ākāś'a*. Hence the *swarūpa sambāndha* is sometimes called *vishayatā-sambāndha*. The two former are something *other* than the things related; the *swarūpa sambāndha* is really one or the other of them.

He now explains by the second line the determined production of barley, &c., from the several seeds as sown. The qualities of the atoms, such as form affected by contact with fire, &c.* produce the distinction, *i. e.* the atoms as possessed of the qualities of form, moisture, &c. affected by contact with fire, tend to produce such and such effects [rice or barley, as it may be,—the desert of the individual acting as the concurrent cause.] In the case of healing [where the opponent might allege that the medicine produced an after effect by means of his supposed continuant capacity,] the drinking of the medicine produces an equilibrium between the three humours, and this is the means of the subsequently produced destruction of the disease.†

XII. “ But how then [except by the assumption of our special category ‘Capacity,’] will you account for sensible touch, &c. in the case of air, &c. [which seem cold, &c. to the body,] where there is no form produced by contact with fire, [as there is in earth ?] or again how is the natural liquidity of water stopped in ice, &c. ? or how in images, &c. do such ceremonies become effectual as those for inviting the deity to take up his residence therein, &c. ? We hold therefore that we must admit such a thing as a capacity produced by the rite *pratishthā*‡ which can be destroyed by the touch of impure persons as the *Chāṇḍāla*, &c., which capacity renders the image a fit object of worship.” He replies,

XII. The perceptible form, &c. and their absence [in ice and air] arise from contact with special causes ; the deities are worshipped through their coming [into the image] or through the worshipper’s consciousness of having duly performed the rite.

The ‘special causes’ are the various kinds of merit in the person [gratified by the cold air or ice.] The deities become conciliated by

* It is a peculiarity of the element earth that its form, taste (or moisture,) smell and touch are changed by contact with fire.

† Our author does not notice the objection of the ploughing in *Mágha*. Another writer *Pakshadharamitra* in his *Padārtha Málá* supplies the omission. According to him “Through the ploughing in *Mágha* the original soil is destroyed by the series of acts tending to the separation of the atoms which destroys their original conjunction, and subsequently by the disintegration a new soil is produced, and through this is the ploughing in *Mágha* a cause of the excellent harvest afterwards.”

‡ The ceremony of consecrating an image of a deity.

the ceremony of consecration, and shew it by coming to take up their residence, *i. e.* by their appropriation of the image and transference of self-consciousness thereto; but by the touch of an impure person such appropriation and self-consciousness are rendered void. Even on the Mīmāṃsaka view which disputes the intelligence of the deities, we can say that it is the idea [in the worshipper's mind] that the worship has been performed in due manner, and that the image has been duly consecrated,—this idea being also necessarily accompanied by the absence of the touch of any impure person,—which constitutes the image's fitness as an object of worship, and the ceremony's importance lies in its contributing to produce this idea. But in reality it is the absence of any impure contact as with a Chāṇḍāla, &c. at the time of the *pratishṭhā* ceremony and also after the ceremony is over, which constitutes the fitness of the image as an object of worship; since the rule “let him worship it when duly inaugurated by the ceremony *pratishṭhā*” implies that the ceremony must be already over. Such is a summary of the discussion.

XIII. “But ought we not to say that in the weighing ordeal, &c. a power or capacity is produced in the scales by the ceremony of the ordeal, and by that a result is produced such as the rising or sinking of the defendant in the scales?”* He replies,

XIII. Only for the discovering of the concurrent of the cause of victory or defeat,—which cause abides as an attribute in the person examined,—are the rules of the ordeal instituted.

Only to discover the concurrent, favourable to the desired result (*i. e.* the rising or sinking in the scale),—the concurrent of the desert which is the proper cause of the victory or defeat in the ordeal,—are the rules of the ordeal instituted. “I who according to the rule of the ordeal now mount the scales am innocent or guilty,”—this consciousness in the man's own mind is the concurrent.—Or another interpretation is “only to discover the residing of (*i. e.* to produce,) merit or demerit are the rules of the ordeal instituted,” and thus in relation to innocence such as is conformable

* For this kind of ordeal see Professor Stenzler's essay on ‘die Indischen Gottesurtheile’ in the Zeitschrift d. D. M. G. vol. ix. p. 665.

to his protestation merit is produced, and demerit in relation to his guiltiness.* The second mode is preferable, as in this way an objection is obviated which would apply to the former, viz.,—"in the case of a man falsely accused of killing a Bráhmaṇ, &c., as his not having done it is not meritorious, how could his consciousness of innocence be a concurrent cause?"†

XIV. But here the Sāṅkhyas come in with their system,—“There is Soul, the abode of intelligence, but not a cause of anything, and consequently unchangeable and eternal; and Nature which is one, unintelligent, subject to development and eternal; the first development from Nature is Intellect, the so-called ‘great’ first principle,—in it are eight attributes, viz. knowledge, ignorance, might, weakness, freedom from passion, subjection to passion, merit and demerit, or the eight may be otherwise enumerated as knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, and demerit,—as this school does not accept the Naiyáyik self-reproductive quality of imagination, *bhāvaná*, since they hold that at the time of memory the perception itself does remain in a very subtil form. As without the assumption of soul we cannot account for the unintelligent product of Nature, Intellect, imagining itself to be intelligent, we conclude that the existence of soul is hence established,—identical with its essential attribute intelligence, since the subject and attribute are always undistinguishable. From Nature arises the Great one, from the Great one Egoism, from Egoism the five subtil elements, form, flavour, smell, touch and sound, and the organs [of perception and action], the eye, skin, nose, tongue, ear, and mind, and the voice, hand, foot, anus and generative organ; while from the subtil elements are produced the gross elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether. This has been thus described, [in the Sāṅkhya Káriká,] “Original Nature is not an evolute; the seven, intellect, &c. are evolvent and evolute; the set of sixteen are only evolute; while Soul is neither evolvent nor evolute.” The set of sixteen is made up by the five gross elements and the eleven organs of perception and action. [Should you ask why we assume mind as our eleventh organ, we reply,] *a.* if the eternal Soul were

* By the former interpretation merit and knowledge act conjointly in producing the result, by the second merit alone.

† This negative knowledge could not be the *sahakári* of a previous *punya*, as there is no *punya* in the absence of an action.

itself associated with the objects of inherent joy and pain, it would follow that there could be no liberation; *b.* if the connection with objects took place in dependence on Nature, it would equally follow that, since Nature is eternal, there could be no liberation; *c.* if the non-eternal objects, jars, &c., were associated with the essential intelligence, it would follow that there could be no such distinction as 'seen' and 'not seen,' [as all the things now existing would necessarily be seen at one and the same moment;] and *d.* if the association of objects and intelligence depended on the external organs only, we could not account for the perceptions through different organs not being simultaneous; and hence we must assume the existence of a distinct organ, mind, in connection with which the external organs produce the association of the object and intelligence. In dreams when a person thinks himself a tiger, &c. there is not present to him the consciousness that he is a man; hence we must also assume the existence of a faculty, egoism, whose function is the assuming the consciousness of various objects. Since we see inspiration and expiration ceaselessly going on, in waking, dreams, and sound sleep, we must assume the existence of a faculty which continues acting throughout, viz. the principle of Intellect endued with the eight attributes before mentioned; the object being brought into connection with Intellect's development, viz. cognition, conceals the real nature of Soul, and hence it is that liberation arises when, from the destruction of the principle Intellect, there ceases to be any connection with objects; while the idea 'I, the intelligent, act' arises from the nonperception of the difference between the (witness) soul and the active intellect. This has been explained in the Bhagavad Gîtâ "actions are ever done by the qualities of nature, the soul blinded by egoism thinks 'I am the doer.'" And this Intellect consists of three portions, the reflection of the Soul, the reflection of the object, and the arising determination, as in the thought 'this must be done by me,'—here '*by me*' shews the reflection of the intelligent Soul, which is not an actual intercourse, but only illusory in consequence of the nonperception of the distinction between the Soul and Intellect; '*this*' shews the reflection of the object; and the arising resolve '*must be done*' is dependent upon both these. The connection of the Soul, as reflected in Intellect, with the object, is what we call knowledge, and the connection of the Soul with this know-

ledge is seen in the determination 'I, the intelligent, act,' " [whereas in reality the intelligent cannot act and the acting faculty cannot think.]

To meet this, he says,

XIV. The attributes of the agent are the determiners [that knowledge and action reside in the same subject] ; and the intelligent is our only agent ; otherwise, we should necessarily have no liberation or else no mundane succession of events.

The attributes merit, demerit, desire and aversion must reside in the same subject with action, since experience of happiness and misery resides in the same subject with action [and these produce all such experience] ; and in the same way we hold that the intelligent soul is alone the agent, as is proved by the impression 'I, the intelligent, act.' The second line adds another refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine. If Intellect were eternal, then there could be no liberation, as the Soul would always remain associated with Intellect ; if it were noneternal, then it must be allowed to have been produced, as a noneternal thing cannot but have been produced ; and in this case, previously to its production, as the attributes belonging to it would be also then non-existent, it would follow that their effects, the various bodies, organs, &c., assigned to individuals, would as yet be equally unproduced, and consequently there would be no mundane succession of events, [and therefore no bondage of soul, and consequently no need of liberation.]

XV. Here steps in the Chārvāka, "well, let desert be an attribute of an intelligent being ; but this intelligent being is not eternal and all-pervading, but a certain kind of element modified in the form of the body, since such phrases as 'I, the pale one, know' prove that it has form [and form is a corporeal attribute.]" He answers,

XV. One does not remember what another has seen ; the body remains not one and the same from decay ; there cannot be transference of impressions, and if you accept a non-momentary existence there is no other means.

If intelligence belonged to the body, there could be no remembrance in youth of things experienced in childhood, just as Maitra cannot remember what Chaitra saw ; nor can you say that the body conti-

nues one and the same in childhood and youth, because of its "decay," *i. e.* destruction, since by a difference of size the thing itself becomes different, as the destruction of the former size is brought about by the destruction of the subject in which it resided. Nor may you maintain that the second body, as the effect, may still remember what had been experienced by its cause the previous body, because "there cannot be transference of impressions," otherwise we should have the child in the womb remembering the experiences of its mother. "But may there not be a transference of impressions from the material cause to the effect?" [the subsequent body being made out of the previous one.] He replies "if you accept a non-momentary existence, there is no other means." In other words, if you do not accept the Bauddha doctrine that all things are in a continual flux,—one heap of atoms the next moment producing another heap,—but allow that things do last from moment to moment, then the parts, as the hands, &c., are the material cause of the body; and, if so, then on your hypothesis, if a person's hand were cut off, the maimed body ought not to remember a former experience of that hand, as it would now no longer be a part (*i. e.* material cause) of the body. Nor can you say that "intelligence belongs to the atoms and therefore there is remembrance because these remain," because, if so, remembrance ought to be imperceptible [while yet it is perceptible by the internal organ, mind.] just as the form of the atoms is imperceptible; and also there ought to be no remembrance of anything once experienced by the atoms of the hand, if there be no longer union with those atoms, the hand being severed from the body.

XVI. "Well then, why not allow, with the Bauddhas, that all things are dissolved every successive moment, and that each previous heap of atoms, as a material cause, produces a succeeding heap as its effect? in this way there is no difficulty to account for memory." He replies,

XVI. This could not be without difference of kind, and if this latter were true there could be no inference; and without inference even your hypothesis could not stand; nor could there be perception without ascertainment.

By "difference of kind" he means the Bauddha notion of "efficient

form,"* without which "this," *i. e.* the doctrine of a continual flux, could not be established; [and this notion cannot be proved] since, on the simple hypothesis of the seed &c. continuing on from moment to moment, you can easily account for the production or non-production of the effect respectively by the presence or absence of the concurrent causes, water, &c., and thence you can account for the production of the shoot by the nature of the seed [without assuming any 'efficient form;'] so that if the individual seed be allowed to continue on, how can there be any such momentary flux?—Again, even if you assume this peculiar kind of species, 'efficient form,' to abide in the perceptible individual but to be itself beyond the cognizance of the senses, there could be no such thing as inference, as fire can only then be the cause of smoke, when its nature as fire acts as the efficient form of the first moment's smoke; but even if you suppose that one special smoke (the first moment's,) is produced by fire, you cannot thereby infer that fire is the cause of *all* smoke, because by your own hypothesis you must allow that this very smoke is the cause of its own special effect, the second moment's smoke, [and this of the third, &c.;] and hence it would follow that all inference would be abolished, as it would be impossible to establish the universal major premiss, which depends for its validity on an argument to preclude the possibility of an instance where the middle term is found disjoined from the major, which argument must be always based on the relation of cause and effect [as existing between the major and middle.†] And without inference it is impossible to establish your own hypothesis of a momentary flux, since it can only be cognized by means of inference. Nor can you say that "perception itself is the evidence of flux," because, according to your doctrine, the only perception which can really have authority is the indeterminate‡ (*nirvikalpaka*) since that alone is produced by the object;

* As the Naiyāyikas hold that the species jar (*ghaṭatwa*) resides in all jars, so the Bauddhas hold that a *quasi-jāti*, called *kurvad rūpatwa*, resides in each thing when that thing is actively employed in producing its effect, as a jar in holding water, or rice in producing a plant. When there is no effect being produced this *kurvad rūpatwa* is absent. But for their assumption of this occasionally present principle, every thing would *always* produce its effect.

† Cf. S. Muktāv. p. 122. There is an interesting attempt in the Sarva Dar's. Sangraha, pp. 7, 8, to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or of genus and species.

‡ The Hindus hold that on the contact of the organ of sense with an object, as *e. g.* a jar, there arises the idea of a jar and also the idea of the nature, *i. e.*

yet—since even this is only inferred from the subsequent determinate perception,—in the case of an object which only lasts one moment, there can be no such determinate perception, and consequently, with the failure of this, fails likewise the indeterminate. Again, the so-called species of efficient form in the case of seed-produced plants is not a true species, as it is obnoxious to the charge of ‘confusion,’ since, *a.*, it will be found present in barley without the species rice,—*b.*, it will not be found in rice stored in a granary [and therefore lying idle and not producing its effect] while the species rice is found present there,—and, *c.*, both species [‘efficient form’ and ‘rice’] are found simultaneously conjoined in sown rice when it is actually producing its shoot.—Hence we Naiyáyikas (to avoid this fault of ‘confusion,’) assume that there are many subdivisions of the species ‘jar’ (and not merely one undivided)—these subdivisions being severally pervaded by [i. e. included under] ‘silver’ &c. [as silver jars, earthen jars, &c.] And [if you ask why we call them all by the common name jar, we reply that] the general appellation jar arises from our viewing them as all possessed of one common attribute, viz. the being composed of parts which [however different in material] possess a particular kind of arrangement [called kambugrívá in the case of jars].

XVII. “Well, then, let us consider the flux hypothesis as still undetermined, [*i. e.* it is at any rate not shewn to be impossible;] for as for any argument against it on the plea of recognition (‘*i. e.* this is the jar I saw yesterday,’) we overthrow it by maintaining that there is a doubt as to its being the same jar.” He replies,

XVII. There can be no doubt as to things continuing, nor as to perception, nor can there be as to authority of proof from the self-contradiction,—as the same proof which establishes the oneness of the object during the moment may establish it during a longer time.

There can be no doubt as to the continuance of objects as we can perceive it by recognition; nor can there be doubt as to our recognition, as we can ascertain its correctness by our being conscious of

ज्ञेय of jar (both being equally objects of perception,) but the two ideas are distinct,—this is *nirvikalpaka*. Subsequently the mind combines them into one idea, ‘a jar possessing the species or nature of jar,’ and this is *savikalpaka*. We are however not conscious of the first step,—it is only recognised as necessary from an analysis of the subsequent compound idea.

possessing this knowledge. Nor can there be doubt as to the authority of *all* evidence "from the self-contradiction" which it involves, since if you doubt of the authority of your own consciousness of doubt the very existence of your doubt is itself unproved; and again, if you cannot establish any thing as authoritative, you cannot have any doubt even as to authority, because you will not have established your point to doubt upon [and your doubt will have no foundation]. "Well, but may we not doubt [not of all authority but] of the authority of your so-called recognition, since we can see cases of erroneous recognition, as when we say of a man whose hair has grown again after it was cut, 'this is the same hair as before,' &c.?" To meet this he gives the second line. The same proof, viz., the absence of opposite qualities, by which we know in the case of the jar which exists only one moment, that during that moment it is the same and not a different jar,—may teach us in the case of the jar which is supposed to continue on from moment to moment, that it too is the same jar and not a different one. Since just as one cognition may be connected with many different objects [as *e. g.* a table with the things on it,] so too one object, as a jar, may, without inconsistency, be connected with many different moments, the connection with those moments being necessarily successive,* because it depends on the succession of the moments, its causes.

XVIII. "Well then let it be considered as proved that there is a cause of another world (*i. e. adrishṭa*;) but here the doubt may arise, *a.* is causality essential or communicated by some thing else,—if the first, then it ought to act indifferently towards all things, just as blue is blue to all; if the second, then if we allow the 'communicating something' to have essential causation, *it* too will be liable to the aforementioned objection; and if, on the other hand, its causation is communicated, we shall have a *regressus in infinitum*, as we shall require an infinite series of such communicating somethings? *b.* And again if causation be essential, effects ought to be produced from the very first moment of the existence of the cause." He replies,

XVIII. Without first determining the power of the

* *I. e.* there must be this difference between the two connections alluded to,—one is contemporary, the other successive.

cause, even blue &c. are not actual existences; it becomes capable when associated with something else, why then should it not be allowed to be universal?

The 'power of the cause' is the cause's nature as a cause, *i. e.* causality [*i. e.* its being such a thing as a cause;] until we have ascertained this, the 'blue' of your illustration has no authority [because, if it has no cause, it must be merely an error;] and so your argument would fall to the ground, viz. "all that is real is universal in its action, as blue, &c. and therefore if causality be not universal in its action, it is not real," since your major premiss will not be universally true if you admit that there is a cause for your quoted 'blue,' as indeed there must be, since it is non-eternal,*—there being no proof of the existence of an eternal blue.—The second line overthrows the second paragraph (*b.*) "It" the cause, when "associated with something else" *i. e.* with the concurrent,† "becomes capable" of producing the effect; hence it does not result that its causality must shew itself in action from the very first moment of the cause's existence. The latter words express that the author has no objection to admit universality of action, if properly understood, "why then should it not be universal?" Even the universality of action which you ascribe to blue, &c., only means really that all men speak of and treat them as blue, &c.; and this kind of universality is equally found in the cause when associated with its concurrents [as fire &c. with fuel, or the seed with water, air, &c.] since it is an established fact, that we all do apply the term 'causality' to such cases, and treat them as such.

XIX. "But if we even accept your opinion that desert may reside in the soul, must we not still say that it is not produced by the soul as a material cause,‡ since in the case of an eternal and all-pervading substance [like soul] there can be no negative instance either in point of space or of time, and causality can only be proved by an induction from affirmative instances together with negative, a cause being defined as that the absence of which necessitates the absence of

* If a non-eternal thing is real, it must have a cause, and therefore your very illustration proves the fact of non-universal causation.

† Our 'condition.'

‡ The Nyāya holds that knowledge, desert, &c. reside in the soul as its qualities, and the subject is the material cause of its qualities.

something else [*scil.* the effect]. But since in this way desert will have no material [intimate] cause, of course it can have no non-intimate and instrumental causes, since they are allowed to be causes only as acting in close proximity to the other ;* and hence it will follow that desert will be eternal [as it is uncaused,] and therefore, being eternal, it cannot be conceived as producing enjoyment, limited to particular souls at particular places and times." He replies,

XIX. Surely precedence is causality, since it is proved by any argument ; likewise for the eternal all-pervading ; otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject.

Causality does not always imply the existence of negative instances, but its true definition is " necessary precedence without superfluous determination."† The negative instance is not the only means of proving causality, since it may be equally proved by the evidence which establishes its subject ;‡ hence the causality of the eternal and all-pervading soul " may be proved by any argument." " Otherwise there could not be the idea of the subject," [as the proof of the soul's existence is that we require a subject for pleasure, pain, &c.] and hence the subject's (*i. e.* the soul's,) being a cause is established by the same argument which establishes the subject's existence. From seeing that the component halves are always found where jars are and jars never found where these are not, we learn that substance as substance is a material cause to the effect connected with it by intimate relation ; and hence, by rejecting earth, &c., we can establish by exhaustion that for the qualities knowledge, desire, &c. there must be a material cause other than earth and the rest, *i. e.* soul.

But in reality there is one kind of argument from negative instances§ which does establish material causation as follows, " that which is not a half, has no jar connected with it by intimate relation ; and similarly, that which is not soul has not knowledge, &c. thus

* Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 12.

† For the five kinds of Superfluous determination of causation see S. Muktāvali, pp. 13—16. The *anyathāsiddha kāraṇa* is that pseudo-cause whose absence does not directly necessitate the absence of the effect.

‡ We have a good instance of this kind of argument in the Sāṅkhya argument for the assumption of the internal organ mind in p. 17. Mind is assumed in order to account for the fact that two cognitions are not simultaneous,—the same proof will of course equally establish that mind is a cause of cognition.

§ This is called the *anyonyābhāva vyatireka* in contradistinction to the *atyantābhāva vyatireka*—the latter is in the form—"where there is no half, there is no jar."

connected with it.' So too we may argue in the case of time [although time is eternal and all-pervading] 'that which is not time cannot have a jar connected with it in that particular relation [called temporal;]' and in this way the argument from negative instances may be applied to prove that time is a condition as the temporal site in which the jar is made.

Thus there is no contradiction between our conclusions and the declaration of S'ruti which affirms that 'the world is delusive,' since the terms Delusion, Nature, Ignorance, &c. really mean only 'desert.' And hence the existence of God is established as the superintendent of desert in producing its effects [by §. iv.]

XX. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter,

XX. May He whose unparalleled concurrent energy *this* is,—called *Máyá* from its being so hard to unravel, or Nature from its being the first principle, or Ignorance from its horror of right knowledge;

May He that deity by whom is lulled the turmoil of the waves of mundane existence,—immediately, himself being the witness, the passionless, create in my mind devotion towards himself.

'This' the concurrent cause in the form of desert,—it is unparalleled since all effects depend upon it,—the word *Máyá* is used to mean 'desert' by metonymy, [as it primarily means Delusion,] 'resemblance' being the cause of the extension of meaning,* as each is alike hard to be unravelled.

* Cf. *Sáhitya Darpaṇa*, ii. §. 18.

Note on the term 'Avachhedaka' (p. 7.)

The term *Avachhedaka* has at least three meanings, as distinguishing, particularising and determining.

a. In the phrase 'a blue lotus' 'blue' is the distinguishing *avachhedaka* (i. e. *viś'eshana*), of the lotus,—it distinguishes it from others of different colours.

b. In the sentence 'the bird sits on the tree, on the branch,' *वृक्षे शाखायां पक्षी*, *s'ākhāyām* particularises the exact spot,—this is the *ekades'āvachhedaka*.

c. But the third is the usual Naiyāyika use of the word, i. e. as determining, *niyāmaka*. Wherever we find a relation which is not itself included in any one of the seven categories but is common to several, we require something to determine its different varieties; thus if we say that fire is the cause of smoke, or, vice versâ, smoke the effect of fire, we do not mean only this particular case but any fire or smoke; we therefore require, to determine this particular relation of causality, something which shall be always found present with it. This in 'fire is the cause of smoke' will be *vahnitwa*, the species or *तद्विज्ञानं* of all fires. This will always be found present wherever the causation of smoke is found, and it is therefore called the *dhūma-kāraṇatāvachhedaka*, as *dhūmatwa* would be the *vahnikāryatāvachhedaka*. If we have several causes or effects (as e. g. green wood in the case of smoke,) each *kāraṇatā* or *kāryatā* will require its own *avachhedaka*. But we could not say that 'substance' is the *avachhedaka* of 'quality' although it does always accompany it,—because quality is a category by itself and not common to several. An *avachhedaka* is always required for such relations as *kāraṇatā*, *kāryatā*, *s'akyatā*, *jneyatā*, *prātiyogitā*, &c. Thus *gotwa* is the *avachhedaka* of the *go-s'abda-s'akyatā*, as otherwise the word *go* might be restricted to mean only this particular cow or extended to include every animal; and in *बहुभावस्य प्रतिशेगी वृद्धिः* we have *vahnitwa* as the *avachhedaka* of the *prātiyogitā*. This determining notion need not be always a species; thus in *कार्यस्य जनकः चेष्टावान् cheshṭā* is the *avachhedaka* of *kāraṇatā*, and *cheshṭā* is included in the category of 'action.'

SECOND CLUSTER.

I. The Second objection was that there is no proof of God, since the means of attaining paradise can be practised independently of any such being. That is to say, "sacrifices which are the instruments of obtaining paradise can be performed even without a God, since it is proved by the Veda that sacrifices are a means of obtaining heaven, and the Veda possesses authority from its eternity and freedom from defects, and we can also gather its authority from its having been accepted by great saints [as Manu and others;] and therefore you cannot establish the existence of God, on the ground that he is the author of the Veda; or we may suppose that the Veda was made by Sages like Kapila and others, who gained omniscience by their preeminence in concentrated devotion."—He replies,

I. Since right knowledge requires an external source, since creation and destruction take place, and since none other than He can be relied on,—there is no other way open.

The right knowledge caused by testimony is one which is produced by a quality in the speaker, viz. his knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used;* hence the existence of God is proved, as he must be the subject of such a quality in the case of the Veda. "But may we not allow that such a quality as the knowledge of the exact meaning of the words used is required in the case of an effect which implies an agent; but in the case of the uncreated Veda it is its freedom from defects which produces its authoritativeness, and we can know its authoritativeness from its having been accepted by great

* All right knowledge, *pramā*, is produced by some virtue in the means used, as all wrong knowledge by some defect. Thus in sense-perception the virtue required is the *āpti* of the eye &c.; in inference it is the knowledge of a real *vyāpti*; and in testimony the right knowledge must be produced by a speaker who knows the true meaning of the words used. The speaker's claim to this knowledge is vitiated by conscious deception as well as by unconscious ignorance; as in the former case the speaker's right knowledge is in abeyance, and it is his assumed erroneous cognition (*dhārya-jāna*) which is the immediate cause of the words used. (Cf. Plato, Rep. p. 382)

saints?" He replies "because creation and destruction take place." After a mundane destruction, when the former Veda is destroyed, how can the subsequent Veda possess authority, since there will then be no possibility of its having been accepted by great saints? And again the non-eternity of sound is proved by the universal conviction 'the letter *g* is produced,' and an eternity in the form of an unbroken succession is stopped by the possibility of mundane destruction. "Well, then, let us say that at the beginning of a creation Kapila and others were its authors, who had acquired omniscience by the power of merit gained by the practice of concentrated devotion in the former æon." He replies "none other than He can be relied on." If you mean by omniscient beings, those endued with the various superhuman faculties of assuming infinitesimal size &c. and capable of creating every thing, then we reply that the law of parsimony bids us assume only one such, namely Him the adorable Lord. There can be no confidence in a non-eternal and non-omniscient being, and hence it follows that according to the system which rejects God, the tradition of the Veda is simultaneously overthrown,—'there is no other way open.'

II. "But may we not reply that your assumption of a mundane creation and destruction is unwarranted, since there is no evidence for it, and there are also several arguments against it. Thus *a.* there is a law that day and night are, from their very nature, uninterruptedly preceded by day and night; *b.* the nature of time in itself is always accompanied by the perception of the fruit of former works, for time brings to effect the various pre-existing deserts [ripening them as seeds sown;] and you cannot prove that desert can suddenly be stopped in its action; *c.* a Brahman must be born from a Brahman, but since at the beginning of a creation no one could be a Brahman [for want of previous merit] you could not establish the necessary succession of caste in the succeeding generations; *d.* as there could then be no teacher or learner, there could have been no acceptance of the conventions of language, and hence you could not establish the tradition of words; and *e.* at the beginning of a creation there could be no dexterity in the different necessary arts of life as making jars, &c., since this requires previous instruction from another, and thus the chain of the tradition of all the arts of life would be cut short." He replies,

II. As in the days of the rainy season &c., time as determining mundane existence is the condition; there is cessation of action as in deep sleep; the castes originated as herbs and scorpions; the conventions of words, &c., are like jugglery.

a. If you would prove that the days of the rainy season have been uninterruptedly preceded by similar rainy days, you must first have the condition that they have been preceded by a certain period of the sun's course defined by his entrance into certain signs of the Zodiac, [as Taurus and Gemini,]—and so here if you would prove that day and night must have been uninterruptedly preceded by day and night, you must have as the condition an uninterrupted series of previous mundane works; or in other words, the limiting condition is the nature of time as determining this mundane existence [and you cannot argue from the mere nature of time in itself.] b. As in time of deep sleep* there is a cessation of the desert which produces the fruit enjoyed by certain individuals, so at special times there may be a cessation of all desert for all souls, hence he says, "there is cessation of action as in deep sleep." c. A certain herb can be produced by the seed of that particular herb and also by the manure of rice-dust;† or again a scorpion can be produced from cow dung as well as from a scorpion; and so at special times by a special desert (or fate) acting alone a Brahman can be produced,‡ while at the present time a Brahman can only be produced from a Brahman parent;—there will be no contradiction as (by I. vi.) we allow that difference of species [though not of genus] does reside in different effects. d. Just as a juggler having made a puppet pulled by strings, bids it bring a jar and the jar is brought, and thus instructs a child, so likewise God, having assumed two bodies in the mutual connection of master and disciple, and thus initiated

* The Vedántins and Sánkhyas hold that in deep sleep there is pleasure, but the Naiyáyikas deny it, as without *jñāna* there can be no *sukha*.

† The water in which rice has been washed is considered an excellent manure from the fertilising nature of the rice-dust. Besides the *tusha* or husk, there is a red covering easily pulverised adhering to the rice-berries, called in Sanskrit कण in Bengali দুঁড় and in Hindustani کن. This is alluded to in the Atharva Veda, xi. 3, 5. अन्नाः कणा गावस्तण्डुला मशकास्तुषाः.

‡ A similar notion of spontaneous production (تولد) after a mundane renovation is found in the Akhláki Jaláli, Introd.

the tradition of words, taught their meanings to the men then newly created. *c.* In the same manner having himself originated the tradition of making jars &c., and the other useful arts, he instructed them therein.

III. The opponent's attempt to preclude any discussion being overthrown, he adds some confirmatory reasons.

III. The gradual failure of the tradition of the Veda, &c. may be inferred from the observed failure of generation, ceremonial purification, learning, &c. and the power of study and of performing ceremonial works.

The argument runs thus,—The tradition of the Veda, &c. is inferred to be subject to entire interruption from its gradually failing, just like a lamp, as it burns on. The rest of the couplet is added to establish the *fact* of the reason given. *a.* 'Failure of generation;' originally creatures were produced from the mind,* then by sexual intercourse solely for the sake of issue, but now entirely through desire of sensual gratification. *b.* 'Failure of ceremonial purification;' originally the very food of the parents† was ceremonially purified, [in the *putreshti yāga*,] then afterwards the child in the womb, then the child after birth, and now hardly at all any how. *c.* 'Failure of learning;' originally they studied the whole Veda with its thousand *S'ákhás* and eventually one *S'ákhá* only, thus it has gradually decayed. By the &c. we may understand 'livelihood,' 'duty,' &c. *d.* 'Failure of livelihood;' originally they lived on gleanings, then on unsolicited alms, then on agriculture, &c., and lastly they supported themselves on the wages of servitude. *e.* 'Failure of duty,' originally duty had four legs, asceticism, knowledge, sacrifice and charity; in each subsequent age, as the *Tretá* &c., it lost one leg, until in the *Kali* it totters on a single leg, charity;‡ or again [taking *dharma* in the sense of observing the prescribed duties of caste, &c.,] once they ate the leavings of the sacrifice, then next the leavings of a guest, then food prepared by themselves, and lastly they ate even with menial servants. *f.* Then we may notice the failure of power to study one's daily portion of the Veda and to perform works as sacrifices &c.; from the failure of the power of study as the cause results failure of the power of learning as

* As *Brahmá's* mind-begotten sons. See also *Indische Stud.* ii. p. 97.

† Cf. *Rámáyana*, i. 15.

‡ Cf. *Manu*, i. 81, 82, 86.

the effect, hence in the S'loka we have the 'power of study' mentioned separately from 'learning.' And in this way with the destruction of the universe are all included living beings destroyed. Thus do we establish the fact of these universal destructions.—The Veda is authoritative as having been received by great saints who displayed a zealous earnestness in the practice of sacrifices, &c.—which earnestness was untainted by such vicious causes as a wish to deceive, association with heretics, acting for some secret motive, addiction to eristic disputation, living as one pleases,* heedlessness of the distinction between lawful and unlawful food and drinks, &c.†

IV. He sums up the substance of the chapter.

IV. Him who in sport having repeatedly made this strangely wonderful world by his illusive power, again causes it to collapse, and having destroyed it again remakes it as a magic show,—that Deity, S'iva, the might of whose will bursts forth unhindered into accomplishment,—him I salute, the sole ground of confidence, and may I continue to pay him homage even unto the end.

* As by unlawful trades.

† Other Pandits divide the original differently and explain it to mean "addiction to eristic disputations, desire of a livelihood, or reckless (*advaita*) lust of food and drink."

THIRD CLUSTER.

I. The third objection was that there were positive arguments to prove God's non-existence. "Just as we infer a jar's absence in a given space of ground, [i. e. its non-existence there,] so we infer God's non-existence from His not being perceived. If you reply that 'the Supreme Being is not a legitimate object of perception, and, therefore, since we cannot here have a valid non-perception, we cannot assume His non-existence,'—we retort that in the same way we might prove that a hare's horn may exist since we have only to maintain that it is not a legitimate object of our perception." He answers,

I. In an illegitimate object [of perception] how can there be a valid non-perception?* and still more, how can you establish your contradiction? How can the hare's horn be precluded as absurd if it be an illegitimate object? and how can you have an inference without a subject to base it on?

In the case of the Supreme Being who is not a legitimate object, how can there be a valid non-perception? It is only *this* which precludes a thing's existence; but the absence of perception which obtains in the case of God cannot exert this precluding influence, as otherwise we should equally be forced to deny the existence of ether, merit, demerit, &c. But a horn must be a legitimate object of perception,—how then can your retort contradict our argument? If you say that a hare's horn is an illegitimate object of perception, then of course its existence is not necessarily precluded,—there is only an absence of proof to establish it; but this cannot be retorted against *us* as the fifth Cluster will fully shew that there are positive arguments to establish God's existence.† "But may we not infer God's non-

* A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.

† We infer that there is no jar when we do not see one, because had there been one, we should have seen it, but in the case of the Supreme Being, ghosts, &c. as they are acknowledged to be imperceptible, we could only *at most* say that their existence is '*not proven*;' and this is here not admissible in the face of the positive argument of the fifth chapter.

existence from the absence, in His case, of a body which always accompanies an agent, and also of any assignable motive for action?" He replies,—how can you have an inference where the minor term is itself controverted? while on the other hand the very proof which will establish the existence of the subject (God), is itself sufficient to debar your subsequent inference [that there is no God].

II. "Well, then, let us say that God is introduced through an error, and that the subsequent argument is to prove either the non-existence of any agency in this wrongly assumed subject or the subject's non-existence." He replies,

II. The very possession of the absence of some rejected attribute proves the subject's reality, since it makes it a locus. The state of a counterentity [to non-existence] *i. e.* the absence of the absence, must belong to a *something*.

"It makes it a locus"—*i. e.* it gives to the absence a 'local habitation' in the subject, and therefore an unreal thing can never properly be a subject. [If you shift your ground and say that the argument is to prove God's non-existence, we reply that] the state of a counterentity to non-existence, *i. e.* the absence of the absence, cannot belong to a *no-thing*, or, in other words, just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the object of a negation.

III. "But why may we not learn the absence (or non-existence) of a thing by its non-perception, even though the thing itself be an illegitimate object of perception?" He replies,

III. In the case of a hare's horn, &c. the validity of their perception would imply defective means thereof; but if these be present, perception would ensue, and if there be no perception, there can be no such means.

Non-perception can prove the non-existence of a thing only where it is the so-called 'valid non-perception;' otherwise we should have to concede the non-existence of all such things as are beyond the reach of the senses.—'Valid non-perception' means the presence of all the various means of perception, other than the thing itself [which is supposed to be absent] or the attributes [as form &c.] inseparably

connected with it. Hence if we allowed that in the case of the [non-existent] hare's horn there was valid non-perception, this non-perception must be accompanied by a set of means connected with certain defects* [like a jaundiced eye &c. ; as this is 'the presence of the various means of perception other than the thing itself or its inseparable attributes.'] But this is unallowable, as in such cases a perception [however erroneous, as of a really white shell appearing yellow,] would ensue ; and if perception does not ensue, it proves that it is not a case of valid non-perception.

IV. Here the atheistic Sāṅkhya will interpose, "why not say that the soul is in some respects ignorant, and that the earth, &c., do not prove creative power to reside therein from the very fact of its having the nature of soul?" He replies,

IV. If you mean the well-known soul, our point is gained, if the unknown, your reason is unproved ; the general consent brings the same result, and in the case of the class it equally holds.

If you mean by soul the well-known mundane individual soul, we are quite willing to grant what you say ; but if you mean the unknown, *i. e.* the Lord, your reason is unproved [as we may dispute that 'the nature of soul' resides in God]. If you reply that all allow that the subject (soul) has the nature of soul, then, according as you decide the alternative—is this 'soul' of yours similar to our *jīvātmā* or different,—we shall accept your argument as proving our own point, or meet you by denying your proposed reason [or middle term]. The last clause of the verse meets the reply "let the *species*, soul, be our subject,"—because in this case too "it equally holds." We agree with you so far as that it is not the *species* that is the maker of the world [but an individual Supreme Soul ;] still as the 'nature of soul' [*i. e.* the idea or species] does not abide in the species itself [but in the individuals] we still deny your middle.

* To understand this, we must remember that the means of perception are twofold,—those connected with the object, *i. e.* producing right impressions, and those connected with a defect in the senses (as jaundice &c.) *i. e.* producing wrong impressions. The non-existent hare's horn cannot be a case of the former, as it is invisible ; nor can it be a case of the latter as this would necessitate some perception, however erroneous.—I have followed the Pandits in taking *yogyānupalābhi* as a *karmadhāraya-samāsa*, but it would make this passage easier, if we could take it here as a *shashṭhi-tatpuruṣa*, *i. e.* as equal to *yogyasyānupalābhi*.

V. "But why not say [with the Vedāntin] that the absence of creative agency is to be proved of that soul which is established by the S'ruti, &c.?" He replies,

V. If the S'ruti, &c. have authority, your negative argument is precluded; if they are fallacious, our old 'baseless inference' [of §. i.] is stronger than ever.

If you admit that the S'ruti, &c. have authority, then, as the existence of God's creative agency &c. is thereby established, your argument to prove their non-existence is already precluded. On the other hand, if they have no authority, our old difficulty of a 'baseless inference' returns in full force [as the minor term, soul, in which the middle 'the nature of soul' was to reside, is itself unproved].

VI. Here the Chárvákas step in, "why talk of such a thing as 'valid non-perception?' [§. iii.] let us lay it down as a rule that whatever is not perceived, does not exist, and hence let the mere absence of perception be a sufficient proof of a thing's non-existence. As for this rule of ours overthrowing all inference, we are perfectly content to have it so, and we grant at once that, on the perception of smoke, to conclude that fire accompanies it is mere supposition." He replies,

VI. There is no doubt in seeing or not seeing, since the existence or non-existence of the thing is ascertained; even perception becomes impossible, if its cause is precluded by its not being seen.

a. [We reply that 'supposition' will not explain men's inferring fire from smoke, for] Supposition is "doubt;" but this does not exist in the case of seeing, as the thing seen is then ascertained; nor does it exist in the case of not seeing, as the absence of the thing is then, in your opinion, concluded. b. If the eye &c., the causes of perception, are precluded as causes by the fact that they are not themselves objects of perception, there will not be even such a cause of knowledge as your perception; but if you grant that these exist even at the very time when they are not perceived, your argument proves too much, and therefore the mere fact of a thing's not being seen does not necessitate its non-existence. c. And again a Chárváka, when he leaves his house, ought to bewail as being well assured that his wife and children have

ceased to exist; and even on his return he ought not to find his family there, otherwise the mere fact of 'not seeing,' as it proves too much, would be no longer a valid reason, [and he should hold like a true philosopher '*amica uxor, magis tamen amica veritas*'].

VII. "But if non-perception be not a proof of non-existence, then would it not follow that a universal proposition can never be determined, as there will always be the fear of some condition at present unseen, and hence an ever recurring fear of some instance of smoke unattended by fire? and if so, what becomes of inference?" He replies,

VII. If there be doubt, there is inference; still more if there be no doubt. Discussion is allowed by all to stop fears, since fear is limited by direct inconsistency.

If, after being assured that in the present instances before us [*i. e.* this smoke and fire,] there is no false assumption of connection, you go on to fear that there may be such in similar instances in another time and place, this very supposition of another time and place comes from inference; hence inference is proved. If there is no such fear, then, in the absence of any fear of the contrary, inference is all the more established. If you ask "what is to stop this fear?" it is replied that this fear is precluded by a discussion to stop any opposite instances. "But have we not here the fault of an '*in infinitum regressus*,' since this discussion is itself based on an universal proposition [*i. e.* the major premiss in which the middle term is declared to be invariably connected with the major?]" he replies 'fear is limited by direct inconsistency; there cannot be any doubt regarding the major premiss on which the discussion is based, when this doubt would contradict some acknowledged principle. Thus supposing that a doubt should arise as to whether the effect might not be produced without any assumed cause,—it would of course follow, if this doubt were legitimate, that we should not seek food to satisfy hunger or employ words to produce an impression on the hearer's mind, [as these and other similar effects could arise without their causes being employed;] and therefore a limiting condition which is only suggested by an unsupported doubt, is of no validity where there is no discussion to back it. This has been thus expressed by a logician, "so long as there is reason to fear even the hundredth particle of a connection

between the middle term and some opposite instance [*i. e.* one which, though it contains the middle, does not contain the major term, as the redhot iron ball in the argument 'the mountain has smoke because it has fire,'] how can the middle term have any power to convince?" Now the fear of a too general assumption of connection depends on the fear of there being some limiting condition to be supplied; as has been said, "some reasons [*i. e.* middle terms which are too general, as 'fire' to prove the existence of smoke,] are dependent on universal connections supplied by others [as that between smoke and 'fire produced by wet fuel;'] these too general reasons, even when seen to be present, do not establish the conviction of the major term." Thus the universal connection with the major term, which exists in a middle term that is limited by a 'condition,'* is cognized as included in the former middle term [as fire] distinguished by the determining notion necessary to define its relation as a middle term [*sc.* the species fire,†] hence it may be said to transfer its own attribute of universal connection with the major term to the old middle term which is, as it were, in juxta-position with it and abides in the same subjects; and therefore the word *upādhi*, here used for 'the condition,' is used by us in the same sense as when it signifies [with the Vedāntins] the China rose which transfers its own redness to the colourless crystal. These too general middle terms, even when they are actually perceived to exist in the subject, do not produce certainty as to the existence of the major term, since the too general attribute [the possession of fire] creates a doubt as to the desired major [smoke.]

VIII. [Thus far for Inference; the opponent, however, may still retort,] "But may we not say that Comparison (*Upamāna*) precludes the existence of God?‡" Now the Vais̥eshikas reply that it does not preclude, inasmuch as they do not allow that Comparison is a distinct species of proof [as it is included under inference,

* As *e. g.* fire produced by wet fuel.

† See note on *Avachhedaka*, p. 26.

‡ *Upamāna* is the knowledge of a resemblance, which produces an inference consisting in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named. Thus a man is told that a *gavaya* (*bos gavæus*) is like a cow, and on seeing the animal in the forest he infers that this is what was meant by the word *gavaya*. Similarly here we have the inference "whatever is like the individual soul is not omniscient nor omnipotent, and this being which is like the individual soul is what is meant by the word God."

See Nyāya Sūtras, ii. 46-48]. Here the Mīmāṃsakas come in and maintain, that Comparison is that proof which gives us the knowledge of a separate category called Likeness. They reason as follows, —*a.* Likeness cannot be a *substance* or a *quality* or an *action*, because it is found residing by intimate relation in qualities [and substance cannot thus reside in qualities, nor can a quality or action thus reside in another quality or action.*] *b.* It cannot be *community* [or genus,] because it depends on its correlative [*i. e.* the other thing with which the first is compared,]† and also because it may reside in genera,‡ &c. [as we may say ‘the genus of cow is, like that of horse, eternal.’] *c.* Nor can it be *non-existence*, since it is not cognized in its relation to the counterentity.§ *d.* Moreover, likeness is not known through *perception*, since it is not cognized by a simple exercise of our senses [but requires some thought and consideration;] nor can you say that the senses may give us the knowledge of it, when there is the contemporary knowledge of the correlative,—because, after the cognition that the *boś gavæus* is like a cow, we may also have the cognition that that cow is like a *boś gavæus*, but this latter cognition cannot be produced by perception as the cow is supposed to be out of sight. *e.* Nor can the knowledge of Likeness be produced by *inference*, since it is produced even in the absence of any sign [or middle term].|| *f.* Nor can it be produced by *testimony*, since this is not present everywhere¶—To meet this theory (of Likeness being a separate category,) he replies in this and the following couplets in the character of a *Vaiśeṣika*.

* Cf. Bhāṣhā Paricheheda, s'l. 13. and Siddhānta Mukta, p. 4.

† Likeness is not identity—it implies the existence of points of difference.

‡ Community or genus resides in the first three categories only. I may add here that the Nyāya does not recognize our subordination of genera and species. The genus is not superior to, but co-ordinate with, the species. Thus *a'swatva* and *sattā* both abide in *a's'wa*, but *sattā* also abides with *ghaṭatva* in *ghaṭa* and with *s'uklatva* in *s'ukla*. Hence *sattā* is called *para*, and the others *apara*.

§ Resemblance implies the correlative, but not the opposite, as absence does, *e. g.* ‘the absence of a jar,’ where the knowledge of the absence depends on the knowledge of a jar.

|| The supposed inference would be “That cow is like the *boś gavæus*, because the former is the correlative to the likeness residing in this latter.” But the knowledge called *upamiti* may be found when this middle term is not explicitly recognized.

¶ The information was to the effect that the *boś gavæus* is something like a cow; and the man's subsequent inference is in a different form, viz. ‘that cow is like a *gavaya*.’

VIII. In the case of contradictories, there can be no middle course; nor can you assume the two contradictories to be identical, because the fact of their contradiction is directly asserted.

"There can be no middle course,*" *i. e.* you cannot make some third supposition different from either, from the very fact that they *are* contradictories [and therefore the one or the other must be true]; nor can you assume them to be identical. The word 'contradictories' in the second line is an instance of the so-called *hetu-garbha-vis'eshana*, or attribute which contains an implicit reason,† [*i. e.* this very word shows why you cannot assume them to be identical.] When you say 'it is not non-existence,' we know that it must be existence, and when you say 'it is not existence,' we know that it must be 'non-existence.' The whole purport of this is as follows,—Likeness must be either existence or non-existence,‡ since no one knows of any third alternative. If the latter, then it at once falls under *non-existence*, the seventh category [of the Vais'eshikas] If the former, then, *a.* if it possess qualities, it must be under the category of *substance*; *b.* should it not possess them, but possess genus, and be other than a quality, it must be under *action*; and *c.* should it be other than an action, it must be under *quality*. *d.* Should it be without qualities and genus, but not itself reside by intimate relation, it must be under the category of *intimate relation*; *e.* should it be found residing in intimate relation and that too in many subjects, it must be under the category of *genus*; *f.* but if found residing in only one subject, it must be the (vais'eshika) category of *particularity*.—In the same way we may refute the supposition of such additional categories as Capacity, Number, &c.

IX. "But why should not Likeness be only a common property, and Comparison be that proof which produces the cognition thereof?"§ He replies,

* We have here our 'excluded middle.'

† In this it differs from the *svarūpa vis'eshana*, which is simply descriptive and nothing more. Cf. the *kāvyalinga* in Rhetoric (Sahitya Darp. X. §. 710).

‡ What follows can only be understood by a reader acquainted with the seven Categories of the Vais'eshikas (Cf. Dr. Roer's translation of the Bhāshā Parichcheda, pp. 1—8.)

§ This was the view of the Vedāntins (see Vedānta paribhāshā, iii.) according to which the *instrument*, in knowledge derived from comparison, was the cognition that 'this animal is like a cow,' and the *conclusion* was that 'the cow is like this *bos gaurus*.' It is refuted by the supposed Vais'eshika.

IX. As Likeness, so too Unlikeness; and so a new proof would be required. If you answer, 'the latter is only a case of Presumption,' then why not say the same of the former?

After the cognition, 'this (camel) is unlike a cow,' you must suppose another cognition, 'that cow is unlike this (camel,)' which must, on your view, be produced by a new proof [*i. e.* a fifth].—"No, this clearly arises from the process called Presumption,* as you cannot have in *this* thing unlikeness to *that* without also having in *that* thing unlikeness to *this*." But the same process will equally apply in the former case, as you cannot have in the *bos gavæus* likeness to the cow without also having in the cow likeness to the *bos gavæus*. So that there is no need to accept a new proof (Comparison) which is to produce a knowledge of Likeness.

X. [Thus far the Vais'eshikas, whose opinion we Naiya'yikas accept so far as it overthrows our common antagonists, the Mīm'an-sakas; but as they have gone further and have attempted to overthrow the existence of this assumed proof,] the Nai'yikas here step forward in defence of the impugned proof, Comparison.

X. They hold that the knowledge of the connection of a name with the thing named is the result of Comparison,† since it cannot arise from Perception, &c.

The 'knowledge' or ascertainment of the 'connection'—*i. e.* power or meaning,—of the 'name,' as *bos gavæus*, with the 'thing named' *i. e.* the animal distinguished by the species *bos gavæus*, is the result of the particular kind of proof called Comparison; 'since it cannot arise from Perception, &c.' as the several causes of those other proofs, *i. e.* the senses, sign (or middle term,) and testimony have no power to produce it.

XI. "But why may there not be a knowledge of the word's

* "Presumption is deduction of a matter from that which could not else be. It is assumption of a thing not itself perceived but necessarily implied by another which is seen, heard or proved." (Colebrooke)—See Siddhānta Mukta-vali, p. 128. The Mīmāṃsakas make this a separate proof, but the Naiyāyikas make it only a particular kind of inference, corresponding to our disjunctive Hypothetical Syllogism (see Bhāṣā P. s'l. 143.)

† This is the Naiyāyika view of Upamāna, cf. Nyāya sūtras, i. 6, and Tarka Sangraha, §. 68.

meaning from* the information previously given, that an animal like a cow is what is meant by the word *gavaya*; or from the inference drawn therefrom, that an animal distinguished by the species *gavayatwa* is what is meant by the word *gavaya* from the very fact of likeness to a cow?" He replies,

XI. Since mere Likeness cannot be the determining attribute, and since *the* determining attribute is not then known, the definite meaning [fixed by the will of God or by human convention,] cannot be made known by testimony or inference previously [to seeing the *gavaya* itself.]

The 'definite meaning' means here the connection [between the name and the thing named] in the form of the word's power as determined by the species *gavayatwa*.† This cannot be obtained from testimony or inference, as the man previously [to seeing the actual *gavaya* in the forest] had not any idea of the true species of the animal.‡ Nor can you assume that the mere idea of likeness can be the determining notion to fix the word's meaning, as it is too vague to possess such an authority.

XII. "But why not say that even although, on first hearing the information given, there is no knowledge of the species *bos gavæus*, yet when the species is known by perception, then from the information 'a thing like a cow is what is meant by *bos gavæus*,'—which by metonymy comes to mean the species,—we may gain the knowledge of the meaning of the word in that form [by testimony and not by comparison?]" He replies,

XII. The sentence, having already logical connection, is complete and seeks nothing further; we only need connection with an implied meaning, where the existing connection of the meanings of the words is incomplete.

When the verbal testimony has produced the knowledge of what is

* The opponent endeavours to shew that this knowledge can be accounted for by testimony or inference, without assuming such a new proof as Comparison.

† The Nyāya holds that a word does not properly mean a species or an individual, but an individual as distinguished by such and such a species; thus the species is the determining notion by which the word can mean any individual of the species. See S. Muktāvali, pp. 82, 83.

‡ At first he only knew vaguely that the word *gavaya* meant a something like a cow; but he did not know the actual species of the animal, its peculiar attributes, form, &c., until he had positively seen it.

meant by the word *gavaya*, from its being applicable wherever the attribute 'likeness to a cow is found,'—it has no further tendency [or *nisus*] to produce any verbal knowledge of the species, because its logical connection is already complete. For it is only where the primary meanings of the words are deficient in their logical connection,—*i. e.* are in any way incompatible with one another,—that we have to search for a connection with some other meaning produced by metonymy, as in the stock example 'a herd station on the Ganges,' [where the word Ganges, primarily meaning a 'river,' by metonymy means the 'bank'].[†]

"But may we not say that the generic argument* "the word *gavaya* is possessed of that which causes direct significance, because it is a word properly formed according to the rules of grammar,"—as we can disprove any other assumed cause of direct significance,—will ultimately, by exhaustion, necessitate our accepting the species *gavayatwa* as the cause of the word's direct significance?" We reply, no, because your major term in the conclusion cannot have any other form than that which it had in the major premiss.[‡] Nor can you say that "the word *gavaya* is possessed of *gavayatwa* as the cause of its direct significance, because it *has* some such cause and all other causes are severally precluded," because such a negative argument is not valid, as your proposed major term is not current, [*i. e.* your major term "possessed of *gavayatwa* &c." is only applicable to this one word, and is therefore not a 'major' term at all.] And again, the cognition that "the abode of *gavayatwa* is what is meant by the word *gavaya*" is established by consciousness as actually experienced, even in the absence of any negative inference; and hence we are compelled to assume a special proof for it, viz., *upamāna* or Comparison. [As for any attempt, as in § ix., to establish a separate proof from unlikeness, we reply,—] After understanding the meaning of such a sentence as 'Shame on the camel with its extraordinarily long neck and eating the hardest thorns, the outcast of beasts,'[‡] the cognizing, on seeing such an animal, that this was what

* For this and the other two kinds of *anumāna* see Nyāya Sūtras I. 5. It is defined by the Commentator as "that which is recognised from generic properties, its own specific ones being unnoticed."

† If from premisses which established that wherever smoke was, fire was, and that the mountain had smoke, we inferred by exhaustion that the mountain had the fire peculiar to mountains and not culinary or digestive fire, this would be an improper inference; and, similarly, here we cannot infer that, because the word *gavaya* is possessed of that which causes direct significance, it therefore must be possessed of *gavayatwa* as that cause.

‡ Cf. Nyāya Sūtra Vṛitti, i. 6.

was meant by the word 'camel' is also produced by Comparison, [which is equally the recognition of likeness or unlikeness.]—Our conclusion is that Comparison, which properly only ascertains the direct significance of a word [and has nothing to do with establishing the object's existence or non-existence,] cannot preclude the existence of God.

XIII. [We now proceed to examine the fourth proof, *i. e.* Testimony;—and here] the Vais'eshikas at once assert that there is no need to fear lest Testimony should preclude the existence of a Supreme Being, as this supposed proof is not different from Inference, [and has therefore been already discussed.] On hearing the words spoken and consequently recollecting their meanings, an inference arises, [they say,] to establish a logical connection between these meanings,*—this inference being in the one or the other of the two following forms,—*a.* "These meanings of words are mutually connected from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the aid of words which possess expectancy, compatibility, and juxtaposition,† just as in the special case of the meanings brought to our recollection by the aid of the words, 'drive the cow with the stick';" or *b.* "these words must have been preceded by the speaker's right cognition of the connection between the several meanings which these words respectively call to our recollection,—from the very fact that they are words possessing expectancy, &c.;"—the latter inference establishing the hearer's knowledge of the connection, from the general rule that 'the cognition of a cognition must have the same object as the original cognition,' [and therefore when I know that such and such was the speaker's meaning, my knowledge must have the same object as his, and consequently no such *pramāṇa* as 'testimony' or *s'abda* is needed.]—He replies,

XIII. If your alleged inference implies certainty, it involves too much; if only possibility, there is no ascertain-

* *S'abda-bodha* is often called *anvaya-bodha*, *sc.* the knowledge of a logical connection between the meanings of the words. There is a current definition, एकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थस्यान्वयबोधः शब्दबोधः

† "Expectancy means a word's incapacity to convey a complete meaning without some other word to complete the construction. Compatibility consists in a word's not having a meaning incompatible with that of other words in the sentence. Juxtaposition consists in the enunciation of the words without a long pause between them." Dr. Ballantyne's *Tarka Sangraha*, § 71.

ment; expectancy is a cause [of Verbal knowledge] by its very presence; juxtaposition, if accompanied by compatibility alone, is unrestricted.

a. In the case of the former inference where the subject is the 'meanings of words,'—we must mean the conclusion to be either that they are *certainly* mutually connected or that they are *possibly* connected, *i. e.* possess a capability of being connected.*

The former alternative involves too much, as it would apply in such phrases as 'he sprinkles with water,' [which would not hold in the case of water in the form of ice;]—under the second, there is no ascertainment of connection at all, and there is also the fault of superfluous inference, as your conclusion, *i. e.* 'possessing capability of being mutually connected,' is already included in your alleged reason 'from the very fact that they are brought to recollection by the aid of words which possess compatibility, &c.'—as the 'compatibility' there mentioned only means that they indirectly possess a character† which necessitates a logical connection between their meanings.

b. As for the second inference, 'Expectancy' is properly the mind's inquiry after certain additional meanings, which are supplied by words suggested by the construction,—as, *e. g.* on hearing the word *cyathum* the mind goes in search of a fresh meaning supplied by a suggested *affer* or *vide*, and on hearing the word *affer*, it similarly supplies *cyathum* or *vestem*; Expectancy is therefore a cause of verbal knowledge by its very presence, [*i. e.* whether it is definitely known or not; but if it were to be included in the middle term of your inference, it must be actually known in order to be so included].

c. "But why may we not say that the cause of verbal knowledge is juxtaposition together with compatibility, [thus excluding expectancy?]"—He replies that they are 'unrestricted,' *i. e.* they are not limited by any 'universal connection' with verbal knowledge‡ [and are therefore useless to produce a conclusion.] Thus in such a sentence as *hic adest filius regis homines summoveantur*, the words *regis* and *homines* possess compatibility and juxtaposition, and would therefore,

* Similarly a cause (*Kāraṇa*) is said to be *swarūpa-yogyā* and *phalopadhāyaka*,—in the former case it exists *ḍvāpaei*, in the latter *ēvepyēia*.

† *Payastwa* resides directly in the *padārtha* but indirectly in the *pada*.

‡ *Scil.* they may be found present where it is absent, as fire is found without smoke.

according to your view, possess a logical connection and produce verbal knowledge, although there is no expectancy, [as the sense is already satisfied by the logical connection between *filius* and *regis*].

XIV. But here the Prābhākaras* come in and say, "Testimony can be a source of right knowledge in the case of the Veda, as the Veda is not made by man and consequently there can be no inference to establish the speaker's knowledge; but in secular matters there is required a previous knowledge, viz., that the testimony is given by a reliable [*i. e.* worthy, *āpta*,] speaker. And thus we have first such an argument as 'this speaker possesses a correct knowledge of the meaning of the sentence which he uses, because he uses a sentence produced by a knowledge of its meaning which knowledge does not arise from mistake, &c.,' [sc. he himself knows, and speaks to inform *me* ;] and this argument will establish the sentence's meaning *indirectly*, as being the distinguishing characteristic of the speaker's knowledge. We may next proceed to use a second argument, [having previously by the former one established that the speaker's knowledge *is* correct,] viz., 'these meanings of the separate words are mutually connected, because they are the object of the speaker's correct knowledge,' and thus *directly* establish the meaning of the sentence. In this way, *i. e.* only after these two arguments, does the knowledge of the connection of words [*i. e.* the knowledge produced by testimony,] arise from words whose meaning is previously fixed by compact; and hence testimony in secular matters is only a repetition [of what is previously known,] and consequently not itself a source of right knowledge at all.† To meet this, he replies,

XIV. Since the meaning is already ascertained, before the inference, from the words whose signification has been ascertained, it is the middle term of your inference which will be a repetition, since the recollection of a universal proposition implies delay.

Even in secular cases the meaning of the sentence is ascertained previously to any supposed inference, since the meaning of the words has

* The Prābhākaras are the followers of the great Mīmāṃsaka doctor, Prabhākara. He is also called the Guru in contradistinction to the Bhaṭṭa, i. e. Bhaṭṭa Kumārila.

† The Prābhākaras define right knowledge as *aprihīta-grāhakatvam* 'the apprehending something previously not apprehended'—see the fourth chapter.

been already determined in the Veda [as you yourselves admit ;] and therefore it is your middle term which is obnoxious to the charge of superfluous repetition, since inference must always produce a slower cognition than testimony, as the former is unavoidably impeded through the delay involved in recollecting the necessary universal connection (*vyápti*).

XV. "But since knowledge produced by testimony is out of the question, where there is any doubt as to the speaker's being reliable and still more where it is certain that he is *not*,—why should we not hold that the ascertainment of this point is the real cause of such knowledge,—and a thing's being spoken by a reliable speaker will mean that it is produced by an accurate knowledge, in the speaker, of the original meaning of the sentence?—thus the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence must originally be derived from inference." He replies,

XV. Since even *there* we must establish our point by an inference,—‘these Vaidic meanings are mutually connected from their being brought to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any imputation of defects incident to a human being’,—how can even the Veda itself be cleared from *that*?

There is no evidence to prove that the ascertainment of the speaker's being reliable is a cause of verbal knowledge; [a truer cause is the one generally admitted to be a concurrent to *S'abda*, viz., the ascertainment of compatibility between the words used,] since in an incompatible sentence we see the knowledge of the connection [*i. e.* the so-called verbal knowledge,] stopped in consequence of the knowledge of the compatibility—*i. e.* the absence of any manifest contradiction,—being retarded [and hence the two seem related as cause and effect.]* If not, then, in the case of the Veda, let the knowledge of its being unproduced by a person, be the cause of verbal knowledge; and as we shall thus have the connection between even the Vaidic meanings established by an inference such as this,—‘these

* This will no doubt require an inference, but this inference will not establish the *S'ábdabodha* but only clear away any apprehended contradictions and leave the way open to the proper cause *S'abda-jñána*. The inference is only a negative, the *S'abda-jñána* is the positive, cause.—I may add that this discussion on *S'abda* is one of the obscurest parts of the book. The old printed text was here very corrupt, and that now given is from the two old MSS. mentioned in the preface.

Vaidic meanings are mutually connected from their being brought to our remembrance by words which are themselves free from any imputation of defects incident to a human being,'—how can we clear the Veda itself from 'that,' *i. e.* the old charge of superfluous repetition?

Some, however, have said that "it is not the *word* but the *word's meaning* which is the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge,—hence we can understand written poetry, &c., because the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence is produced by the meanings of the words [although the words are here not spoken*]. [It might be said in objection that, if this were true, the accusative *dwāram* 'januam' ought to produce verbal knowledge by itself; but to this we should reply that] even though we grant the knowledge of 'janua,' there can be no knowledge of connection, *i. e.* verbal knowledge, in the absence of the quality of 'expectancy'† which necessarily resides in the word's meaning,‡ according to the rule 'verbal expectancy is fulfilled by words alone.'§ In this way we should refute the opinion of the Guru Mīmāṃsakas, viz., that 'the meanings of words are [not the cause of verbal knowledge but] only the distinguishing mark of the phrase 'knowledge of the meaning of the word,' since without the knowledge produced by words there cannot be the knowledge of the connection of the meanings of words,|| as has been said, "from their coming first, from their power of conveying a meaning, and from their conveying the speaker's intention, the power of causation must pre-eminently be held to reside in words." ' This opinion we repeat, is overthrown,—because, if we only substitute 'reliable speakers' (*āptānām*) in the *s'loka* quoted, for 'words' (*padānām*), we see directly that the 'being spoken by a reliable speaker' is only a distinguishing mark of the phrase, 'the knowledge of its being spoken by a reliable speaker;'¶ and since the knowledge of the word's meaning must be granted, the word *per se* is a superfluous, and not a true, cause."—This

* *Paḍa* means a word spoken, cf. S. Muktāvali, p. 78.

† See Ballantyne's transl. *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, p. 14.

‡ In written poetry none of the words are properly *paḍas* and therefore there can be *anvaya* and *ākāṅkṣā* between them; but not so between one spoken word as *januam* and another not spoken as the understood *claude*.

§ In written poetry it is *ārthikākāṅkṣā*.

|| That is, according to the Guru, there is a series, 1, the *paḍa*, 2, the *padārthopasthiti*, 3, *S'ābdabodha*, but the first is the true cause of the third.

¶ That is, the supposed series will be, 1, *āpta*, 2, *āptoktatvajñāna*, 3, *S'ābdabodha*; but all allow that *āpta* is not the cause of verbal knowledge but only of the spoken words. Similarly *paḍa* cannot be the true cause in the former series.

laboured exposition is, however, mistaken, since the meanings of words cannot be the cause of verbal knowledge, from the very fact that they may apply to past or future as well as to what is actually present; nor can we say that the recollection of the word's meaning is an instrumental cause, since it has no operation (*vyápára*).^{*} The true instrumental cause is the knowledge of the word [produced by hearing,] and its accompanying operation is the recollection of the word's meaning—[these directly and indirectly producing verbal knowledge.] In the objected case of written poetry, &c., the instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is a mental knowledge of the word, [its corresponding operation remaining still the same, *i. e.* the recollection of the word's meaning].

XVI. [Having thus established the fact that testimony is a separate proof against the Vais'eshikas in § xiii. and having overthrown the wrong notions of the proof as held by the Mīmāṃsakas in §§ xiv. and xv., he now proceeds to shew that this proof cannot preclude the existence of a Supreme Being.]

"Well, then, let us concede that Testimony is a distinct kind of Proof; but why should it not preclude God's agency as a Maker?† Thus we read in the Bhagavad Gítá "Though actions are ever done by the qualities of Nature, the soul, blinded by egoism, thinks 'I am the doer.'" 'Nature' means here the principle, Intellect,—the 'qualities' goodness, &c.; the soul thinks through delusion that itself does the actions done by these. Hence agency is imaginary, not real. But in the case of an omniscient Being there could be no such imagination, since He would see every thing as it really is.—For the grammar of the couplet quoted, we make *Kartá* govern the accusative instead of the genitive, in accordance with the rule in Pāṇini (ii. 3. 69.)" He replies,

XVI. The testimony of an unworthy person has no force of proof; there can be no 'worthiness' in the case of a thing not seen [by the speaker]. We must have an omniscient Being to see the invisible, and an eternal Veda is untenable.

^{*} The Naiyáyikas maintain, against the Vedántins, that every *Karṇa* must have a *vyápára*,—for the latter's definition, see *supra* p. 13, note.

† In which case it would preclude his existence, as the Naiyáyikas only accept a Supreme Being as a Creator, and not as an Epicurean deity.

If this testimony of the 'Sruti, which you bring forward to establish that God is not the Maker of all things, is the testimony of an unworthy person, it has no authority; if it is the testimony of a worthy person, then one who possesses the knowledge of such transcendental facts *must* possess an eternal and all-embracing knowledge, since all allow that He has no organs, &c.* The eternity of the Veda has been already disproved [in the second cluster;] and therefore the existence of an eternal and omniscient Author of the Veda is established.

XVII. "But if so, then what becomes of those passages of 'Sruti† which declare that there is no such Maker?" He replies,

XVII. Such passages have more than one meaning, since the S'ruti also declares His existence; they may merely mean that He is unstained [by attributes;] and if the S'ruti declares His existence, it cannot imply the opposite.

These passages, to which you refer, do not necessarily bear only one meaning, *i. e.* His non-existence,—since there are many other passages which establish His existence, as *e. g.* that from the Gítá, "from me all proceeds;" and the two meanings cannot be equally valid, since they are mutually contradictory. If we examine them more closely to decide which alternative is the true one, we shall find that the [apparently] opposing passages really mean only that God is to be contemplated as the Soul void of all special qualities; while the confirmatory passages become the properly authoritative, inasmuch as they are supported by the inference, based on the discussion of the relation of cause and effect, &c., [which will be given in Chapter V.].

XVIII. [Having thus shown that Testimony cannot preclude the existence of God, he next proceeds to examine the supposed fifth Proof of the Vedántins and Púrva Mímánsakas, *i. e.* Presumption or *Arthátpatti.*] "But if this Being were omniscient, would He not cause us to act, even without giving us definite instructions [as in the Veda?]—and hence the uselessness of Vaidic instructions, thus involved in your hypothesis, is of itself sufficient to preclude the existence of God.

* The &c. includes body, middle term in inference, &c. These causes of knowledge being thus excluded, God's knowledge must be uncaused, and therefore eternal. If any should be inclined to attribute them to God, on him must lie the *onus probandi.*

† E. g. the Rig Veda, *ko addhá veda*, &c.

You cannot say that He does not know how to make men act in a certain way unless He gives them definite instructions,—since this would overthrow His supposed omniscience. This is a case of Presumption,* and Presumption we hold to be a fifth kind of Proof.” He replies,

XVIII. Since the absence of the cause involves the absence of the effect, there can be no knowledge without proof; and in the absence of knowledge there can be no action. The same rule will hold even on an atheistic theory of sacrifice.

If there be no cause of knowledge, (*pramāṇa*) there can be no knowledge, (*pramā*.)† since the absence of the cause necessitates that of the effect; and if knowledge be wanting, there can be no action, since action is caused by knowledge. Now, in the present instance, the only cause of knowledge is such a Vaidic injunction as “let him who desires heaven offer the Agnishtoma sacrifice,” &c.,—hence Vaidic instructions are by no means useless. Otherwise [i. e. if you allow the possibility of ceremonial works without an authoritative command (*vidhi*)] “the same rule will hold even on an atheistic theory of sacrifice” [like that of the *Mīmāṃsā*;] as we can similarly prove that the Veda is still useless, since destiny can set men in action without it. But the true view is that Presumption is not a separate kind of Proof.

XIX. This latter view he now proceeds to establish,

XIX. If there were no limitation, there could be no inconsistency,—that which does not limit cannot establish [any absurdity;] there can be no real contradiction between two equally trustworthy proofs; and if Presumption were admitted, it would equally apply to the commonest cases of Inference.

a. The well known example of Presumption is—that on ascertaining that the living Devadatta is not in the house, there arises the knowledge that he is out of doors. But in this very instance, if there were no limitation or understood ‘universal affirmative connec-

* For Colebrooke’s definition, see *supra*, p. 40, note.

† *Pramā* here means only *jñāna*,—it simply implies a conviction in the agent’s mind, whether right or wrong.

tion' (*anvaya-vyápti*,) there could not arise that conviction of absurdity or inconsistency with the premisses which any other conclusion would involve, [which forms the very essence of Presumption; since it is only valid by adding as a suppressed major premiss that the living Devadatta must be either within or out of doors.] "That which does not limit,"—i. e. that which does not invariably accompany the middle term—cannot establish your presumed inconsistency, since this inconsistency is only valid where the absence of the including major term necessarily involves the absence of the included middle.* Hence the recognition of such a threatened inconsistency [as you maintain in this proof of Presumption] can really be resolved into the recognition of a general negative proposition (*vyatireka-vyápti*,) which would necessitate a negative conclusion contrary to the facts.†

b. It has also been maintained that "after the cognition that 'he is somewhere but he is not in the house,' there arises the idea of contradiction, and our proof of Presumption comes in to resolve this apparent contradiction by shewing that the words 'he is somewhere' really mean that he is somewhere *else* than in the house." But this is untenable. For two equally trustworthy evidences‡ cannot be contradictory, because, in such a case, one would necessarily have to give way; but wherever we have such an apparent contradiction, inference will serve to establish that they must relate to different subject matters, as we may reason that an [apparent] contradiction must relate to different subjects from the very fact that it is established by certain proof, for if it did relate to the same subject it would involve an absurdity. If this were not so, you might have such a Presumption as 'smoke will establish the existence of fire,' since without fire it would be absurd, and thus there would be no such proof as the Inference which our opponents allow as well as we. Again, we might have such an apparent contradiction as 'fire is not perceived at the foot of the hill, and yet the seen smoke is a proof that there is fire somewhere,' and we should have to call in the assistance of your Presumption to establish the existence of fire in some other part of the hill. [Nor can

* I. e. The absence of fire (the *vyápaka* in an *anvaya-vyápti*,) necessarily involves the absence of smoke (*vyápya*).

† I. e. His not being out of doors (when he is not within,) is always accompanied by his non-existence.

‡ As e. g. the sense-perception that he is not in the house, and the testimony that he is somewhere, drawn from the infallible dictum of astrology that our friend will live a hundred years.

the opponent object to this that "inference *must* still always be granted, as without it the proof that establishes the constant accompaniment of smoke by fire could not establish the conclusion that fire exists in the present case,—because we reply that] even if there were no such thing as inference at all, the proof that establishes* the constant accompaniment of the middle term by the major would still establish the existence of the major term in the present case [i. e. that there is fire in this mountain] by Presumption. Hence the admission of Presumption as a proof would only abolish Inference.

XX. That *Non-perception* (*Anupalabdhi*.) [which the Vedántins and Púrva Mímánsakas add as a sixth proof or source of right knowledge,] cannot preclude the existence of God, has been already shewn in the first couplet of this chapter; but in reality this is not a distinct kind of proof at all. This he now proceeds to shew,

XX. From the cognition of non-existence not being mediate—from the senses not being then engrossed in other objects—from its instrumental cause not being cognized,—and from the internal sense having to do with actual entities,

- a. All must allow that *that* knowledge is a case of '*perception*,' the cause of which is a non-perception whereof we are ourselves unconscious,†—since that knowledge of an object's non-existence which was produced by a conscious non-perception would be a case of '*inference*,'‡ and all knowledge is produced by the senses which is non-eternal§ and immediate. By its 'not being mediate' we mean that it is 'not caused by knowledge,' [which is the distinctive mark of perception, as contrasted with inference, comparison and testimony.]
- b. The senses are the instrument in the perception of a jar's absence as of its presence, since there is no preferable object to engross their energy,—for assuredly we cannot say that their energy is then engrossed in the perception of the *site*, since the ear can detect the cessation of sound (i. e. its *dvans'ábháva*.) even where there is no

* See Bháshá parichchheda, 'sl. 136, a.

† A common definition of perception is 'that knowledge whose cause is not cognized', *ajnáta-káranakam jñānam*, e. g. the sight does not perceive the eye, &c.

‡ The inference is that a jar is not here from the fact that it is not perceived.

§ I. e. *janya*. The Divine *pratyaksha* is of course eternal.

perception of its site, ether,—and the eye can similarly detect the absence of form in the air. *c.* We can also conclude by inference that the knowledge of a thing's absence is produced by the senses,—from its being a knowledge produced by an instrumental cause which is itself not recognized. *d.* Our perception of external objects is universally produced by the mind (or internal sense,) assisted by instrumental causes [as the senses] which are themselves actual entities [and not, like Non-perception, a mere negation]. For these four reasons we conclude that the senses, and not the so-called Non-perception, are the true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence from a given spot.*

XXI. He now adds other reasons for this opinion, as follows.

XXI. It must be the senses, from their power of perceiving the counterentity; from the inseparability of the operation from the cause; from the fact that defects reside in the senses; and from determinate perception.

Our intended conclusion is that the senses are the true instrumental cause in the perception of a thing's absence.

a. "From their power of perceiving the counterentity" to the absence, [*i. e.* the thing said to be absent]. Just as Inference can make known to us a thing's absence as well as its presence, so also can the senses. *b.* "But may we not say that the power of perceiving the counterentity is not a proper reason for your inference, since all causes are of course subject to the condition of 'being free from superfluous causation'?"† and in the present case, the senses perceive the site, and are therefore 'superfluous causes' for perceiving the absence in that site,‡ [the perception of the site being the true cause of the perception of the absence]. To this he replies, "from the inseparability of the operation [from the cause]." Thus the senses are not a 'superfluous cause,'—because the perception of the site [which you erroneously take to be the cause] is only the operation (*vyāpāra*) which invariably accompanies an instrumental cause.§ If this were not so,

* Both parties allow that non-existence is an object of perception, but the Vedāntins hold that *anupalabdhi* is its proper cause, while the Naiyāyikas hold that the senses are the true instrumental cause and *anupalabdhi* only a concurrent.

† For *upādhi* and *anyathāsiddhatva*, see p. 37, and note, p. 24.

‡ Just as the father of the potter is a superfluous cause for making the jar.

§ The *vyāpāra* is the *causa causata* (*taj-janyatve sati taj-janya-janakah.*)

the eye, &c., would be superfluous instrumental causes in the perception of a thing's existence, in consequence of such an operation as the conjunction of the eye with the object. *c.* We must all allow that an erroneous perception of a thing's absence, [when it is really present,*] arises from a defect in the instrumental cause, and defects reside only in the senses, &c., for non-perception in itself admits of no defect, and the true faults of the senses are such as jaundice, &c. Hence he adds "from the fact that defects reside in the senses." *d.* A determinate perception of the spot of ground and the absence† cannot [according to your opinion] be produced by the senses, because it is a perception of absence or non-existence,—nor can it, on the other hand, be produced by Non-perception, as it partly includes existence [so far as the spot of ground is concerned;]—hence we must accept the senses as the cause of determinate cognition.‡

XXII. [The opponent may, however, raise an objection to our last argument,] *a.* "Why may we not say that Non-perception, [although it does not produce the determinate cognition,] produces the [indeterminate] cognition of the absence of the jar, and then follows the cognition of the spot of ground as possessing the absence of the jar, [which latter cognition is produced by the senses, acting by a transcendental relation called *jñānalakṣhaṇa*,] just as the transcendental perception by the eye that 'sandal' wood is sweet'§ is said to follow the perception of its sweetness by the proper sense, *i. e.* that of smell; and in this way non-perception may be called an instrumental cause as producing the cognition of absence. By examining a determinate perception we are compelled to infer that the object must be first perceived indeterminately and is then subsequently perceived determinately by the senses. *b.* Again, how can we be said to have any proper 'sense-

* As when a jaundiced eye does not see a white shell but a yellow one. See *supra*, p. 27, note.

† *I. e.* this spot of ground has the absence of a jar,—see *supra*, p. 20, note.

‡ By the opponent's opinion this particular determinate perception can be produced neither by *indriya* nor by *anupalabdhi*; but according to ours there is no difficulty, as *indriya* is equally the instrumental cause in cases of *bhāva* and *abhāva*, the difference being that in the former *indriya-sanyoga*, in the latter *anupalabdhi*, is the concurrent.

§ This is the so-called *jñāna-lakṣhaṇā* which takes place where one sense supplies a perception which is properly given by another. (Cf. *Bhāṣā-parīkṣheda*, s'l. 64.) It is said to cognize the object (as *saurabha*), *per se*, apart from any thing connected with it, and is thus distinguished from the *sāmānya-lakṣhaṇā* which cognizes all the cognate objects under the form of the species, as definitely perceived in the individual object, *e. g.* all jars past, present, and future, as possessing the species of this jar. Both are transcendental (*alaukika*) perceptions.

perception' of non-existence since it has no direct connection with the senses? for the only relation which absence could be said to be capable of, *i. e.* that called the *vis'eshanātā sambandha*,* cannot but involve another relation simultaneously existing with it. Hence we must allow that the instrument [in the cognition of *abhāva*] cannot but be our unavoidably assumed Non-perception, and not any one of the senses." He replies,

XXII. From the cognition of the distinguishing mark, if such is accepted,—from the superfluousness of the assumed proof, if such is not accepted,—from the 'in infinitum regressus' if we assume another relation; and if you do not accept my view, any other explanation is untenable.

a. Those who hold that the cognition of the 'distinguishing mark,'—*i. e.* the cognition of the counterentity,†—is the cause of the perception of *abhāva*, must also hold that there can never be an indeterminate cognition of *abhāva* at all, since we find in this case the means for producing determinate cognition only;‡ but in the perception of a real object, as a jar, there must be first the indeterminate cognition alone, since at that moment there can be no cognition of the distinguishing mark as distinguishing, [*i. e.* *ghaṭatwa*] which is the cause of the subsequent determinate cognition. *b.* But those who hold that we can perceive *abhāva* apart from its counterentity, [*i. e.* without bringing in the idea of any relation between them,] can also allow that we have an indeterminate perception of *abhāva*; and as this can be easily derived from the senses like any other case of indeterminate perception, it follows that the supposition of Non-perception as a distinct proof is superfluous.

c. "From the 'in infinitum regressus,' if we assume another relation." The relation called 'the nature of the thing' and not any new

* *Vis'eshanātā* means 'the state of being a *vis'eshana* or distinguishing mark or property;' thus the jar on a given spot is the distinguishing peculiarity of that spot, and there are thus two relations which the jar holds to its site, that of 'distinguishing' (*vis'eshanātā*) and that of 'contact' (*sanyoga*). But since in *abhāva* there is no such second relation, we have no right to suppose the first. The Naiyāyikas, however, hold that this is really included in the *svarūpa sambandha*, see *supra*, p. 13, note.

† The *avachchheda* or *vis'eshana*, in the phrase *ghaṭābhāva*, is of course the counterentity or *pratiyogi*, *i. e.* *ghaṭa*.

‡ In the indeterminate, you have not as yet the idea of the relation of 'distinguishing' and 'distinguished,'—see p. 21, note.

category, is really the only relation existing between the *abháva* and its site,—since the assumption of such a relation here as a special *vis'e-shanátá*,* would certainly lead to an endless succession of relations;† and hence we must accept such a relation as that called 'the nature of the thing,' [and this being *sui generis* requires no second relation]. [If you ask "how can *abháva* be an object of sense perception at all," we reply,] that its sense-perception is possible because the relation between the eye and its object, which is necessary in every act of perception, is here fulfilled (in the case of an absent jar,) at second hand by the relation between the spot of ground and the said absence, which we call the distinguishing relation.‡

d. If you do not accept my explanation of this *swarúpa* relation between the jar's absence and its site, then it will be extremely difficult to establish any other principle, even on your hypothesis that a proof called Non-perception is an instrumental cause. For to explain more fully,—all allow that no proof or source of right knowledge [and therefore not even your own Non-perception,] can apprehend any thing subsequently which was not originally an object of indeterminate cognition,§ and thus even in inference, &c., we all admit that there must have been some previous indeterminate cognition of fire, &c.,|| [and therefore there must be an indeterminate cognition of *abháva*, and this can only be caused by the senses alone.] Again, the very phrase, 'a site of ground possessing the jar's *abháva*' compels our opponents to admit some relation between the *abháva* and the site [and this can only be that called *swarúpa*, which we have previously established.]

* Understanding by it a separate relation from *swarúpa*.

† I. e. just as the relation of contact requires another relation, i. e. that of intimate relation, so this relation would require a relation to connect it with its related subjects, and so on. The Nyáya holds that *samaváya* and *abháva* abide in their subjects by the *swarúpa sambandha* only.

‡ The spot being distinguished by the absence of the jar, *ghatábhávavad bhútaalam*. This will be clearer to the reader if he will compare the description in the Siddhánta Muktávali, p. 51, how the eye sees the jar by direct contact, its form by the intimate relation existing between the jar and its qualities, and the form's species (*rúpatva*) by the intimate relation between that species and the *rúpa*. It may be illustrated algebraically $\{ (a + b) + c \} + d$.

§ The indeterminate knowledge is neither *pramá* nor *bhrama*, and therefore there is no *pramāna* for its production.

|| Similarly in testimony, before we can understand the sentence *Devadatto gacchhathi*, (i. e. *Devadatto gamanakartá asti*), we must have had an indeterminate cognition of *Devadatta* and *gamana*.

XXIII. He thus sums up the substance of the chapter.

XXIII. Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His countenance,* the various proofs,—Perception and the rest,—fail even to attain their proper nature,† and the threatened rise of contradiction is utterly crushed down; to Him, then, the one to whom all are subject, who delights in the sportive exercise, unrivalled and independent, of His almighty power,—to Him, the god even of gods, we betake ourselves with our highest faith aroused.

“Paralysed in their power by necessarily looking to His countenance,” *i. e.* their force precluded by positive arguments which prove the subject's actual existence. ‘He delights in the sportive exercise of his power,’ since He is the one primary cause of the absence of pain.‡

* They depend on God, as otherwise, by § 2, the inference would be baseless without a subject; and this defect is only removed by the inference itself being overthrown—in other words the *ās'rayāsiddhi* is only avoided by *bādha*.

† They cease to be ‘proofs’ at all.

‡ Cf. the definition of Final Liberation in the Nyāya Sūtras, I. 22 as ‘absolute deliverance from pain.’

FOURTH CLUSTER.

I. The fourth objection was that even if God did exist, he could not be a cause of right knowledge to us. "God cannot be an authority to us, because he has no right knowledge, as his knowledge lacks the indispensable characteristic of cognizing an object uncognized before;* hence he neither possesses right knowledge himself nor can produce it in us, and who would trust the words of a being who cannot be a cause of right knowledge?" He replies,

I. Cognizing for the first time is no true mark, as it is both too narrow and too wide; we hold right knowledge to be an independent impression which corresponds to the reality.

Your 'cognizing an object uncognized before' is not an indispensable characteristic mark of right knowledge, as it fails to apply in such an affirmative instance as repeated knowledge [*i. e.* seeing a thing a second or third time], and wrongly applies to such a negative instance as the erroneous judgment that 'this [nacre before me] is silver.' He then gives his own definition in the second line. The ancient Pandits did not apply the term 'right knowledge' to remembrance, because it is necessarily 'dependent,' as it has the same object as the original impression which produced it, and therefore its authoritativeness must stand or fall with that of its originator. Hence he adds the epithet 'independent.'

II. "*a.* But" (reply the opponents) we may deny that our definition is too narrow as not applying to repeated knowledge. We maintain that cognition must produce a particular quality, [*i. e.* cognizedness,] residing in the object,†—otherwise there would not be

* The P. Mīmāṃsā concludes that as God must *always* know, his knowledge would not fall under the definition of 'right knowledge.' They deny that remembrance can be right knowledge; the other schools generally allow that it is a kind of *pramā* but not independent.

† The Sanskrit reader will observe that this is the opinion of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas in the S. Muktāvali, p. 118. They hold that all cognition is super-

in cognition the definite distinguishing of the object, [*i. e.* that this thing is cloth and not a jar;] and hence, even in repeated cognition, we have 'the cognizing of a thing before uncognized,' [since each separate act of cognition on our part produces *anew* this particular influence or quality in the object, and this therefore is ever cognized anew.] *b.* [Again, you would prove the existence of God by the argument that the creation of the world must imply a previous knowledge of the material cause,—*i. e.* the atoms, out of which it was made,—from the very nature of effects, since all effects, as jars, &c., imply such a knowledge; and as this knowledge is not found in individual souls, it must belong to the Supreme Soul. But we would meet this by proposing a dilemma.] When you talk of 'God's knowledge of the world's material cause,' do you allow that this knowledge produces this particular quality of cognizedness in its object or not? If you allow it, then you must also concede a second similar quality of cognizedness, residing in the knowledge itself, in order to distinguish definitely that it *is* the knowledge of the material cause, [*i. e.* to know that he knows it,] and this again will necessitate a third and so on,—thus we have a regressus in infinitum. If you do not allow it, then your alleged reason (or middle term) 'the very nature of effects' fails from being too general,—since in this very instance 'cognizedness' is an effect and yet you own that *it* is not produced by a previous knowledge of the material cause. Hence we cannot admit that the existence of God is proved as the Maker of the world." He replies,

- II. In the absence of the object's real nature to distinguish it, it would be useless to seek help [from cognizedness;] and even supposing that, without this (nature), you might succeed in an existing object, yet what could you do in a non-existing?

The especial nature of the thing is that which definitely distinguensuous; but after the cognition of a jar there is produced in the jar a quality called cognizedness,—this cognizedness becomes an object of perception in the form 'this jar is cognized by me;' hence I infer the existence of the cognition from its effect, and I also at the same time infer the correctness of the cognition. The Nyāya holds that the three steps, 1, knowledge, 2, consciousness or knowing the knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*), and 3, the knowledge of its correctness are successive; the Mīmāṃsā holds that the two last are simultaneous and in fact identical.

guishes the object [so that we determine it to be not a jar but cloth;] otherwise there would be no definite distinction, even though your quality of 'cognizedness' had been communicated to it. And again, even although we granted that 'cognizedness' is produced in the case of an existing object, yet it could not arise in the case of a non-existing object, [as *e. g.* a jar now destroyed,] since its material cause, [*i. e.* that object,] would be non-existent; and hence it would follow that here, at any rate, there would be nothing definite to distinguish the object. We therefore conclude that a thing's special nature is that which alone definitely distinguishes it.

III. "But may we not apply the general rule, 'an action must produce some effect on its object,' and hold that the action of cognition similarly produces a quality residing in its object?" He replies,

III. 'Action' cannot serve you as a reason to prove any new quality [such as 'cognizedness,'] since it is either too general or falsely assumed; nor will perception prove it, since it shews that cognition is itself the distinguishing connection.

a. If you mean by 'action' the signification of the verbal root, then, as in such an instance as 'he unites his arrow to the sky' there is no effect produced by the action on its object the [impassive] sky, your assumed reason is too general. *b.* If you mean by 'action' the operation of the instrumental cause,* then again also your reason will be too general, as no effect is produced on the jars by the contact of the organs of perception therewith. *c.* If you say that 'action' means motion, then, as cognition is not a motion at all, your reason is falsely assumed in the subject.† *d.* "But may we not say that such phrases as 'the jar is cognized,' 'the jar is intuitively known,' &c., shew that perception is the proof of this very quality of cognizedness?" [as 'cognized,' &c., really mean 'possessed of cognizedness,' &c.] He replies by the second line of the *s'loka*. Wherever you have a de-

* Cf. Bhāṣā P. 'sl. 58. and *supra*, p. 13, note.

† *Svarūpāsiddhi* is that fallacy where the assumed middle term is not present in the subject or minor term, as 'the lake has fire, because it has smoke.' In the present case the argument is 'cognition produces an effect on its object from the very fact that it belongs to the class action,' action being defined to mean 'motion.'

finitely distinguished cognition, you have as its object the distinguishing attribute, the thing distinguished, and the connection which exists between them; and this connection may sometimes be that of contact [as in such cases as 'the spot of ground possessing a jar on it;'] in others it may be the connection constituted by the nature of the things connected.* Now just as we see in such [*reversed*] phrases as 'the cognition of the jar'† [where the jar is that which distinguishes the cognition, and the Mīmāṃsakas allow that their cognizedness only resides in an object and not in the cognition,] that the latter kind of connection is that which exists between the cognition and the jar, so the same connection appears to be found in such phrases as 'the jar is cognized' [where the cognition is that which distinguishes the jar‡]. Otherwise, if this were not the connection, you would have to assume in such cases as 'the jar is desired,' 'the jar is produced,' novel connections such as 'desiredness' and 'producedness.'

IV. [If the opponent reply, "why should we assume these novel connections? The well known *swarūpa-sambandha*, i. e. the connection constituted by the nature of the things, will suffice in these cases;" to meet this] he now proceeds to shew that the *swarūpa-sambandha* will equally serve in the original case of dispute, [i. e. the same connection which holds in such cases as 'the jar is made,' 'the jar is desired,' &c., will equally hold in 'the jar is cognized.']

IV. The cognition is distinguished by its object alone, since the cognitions themselves have no definite form to distinguish them from each other; and in the common phrases about the objects of actions it is the verb which distinguishes.

Just as [in such phrases as 'a cognition of the jar'] we have the knowledge distinguished by its object the jar, [i. e. it is *that* which

* See note, p. 13.

† Here all agree that the cognition does not reside by intimate connection (as the genus in its individuals,) nor by contact (as the jar on the ground;) and therefore by exhaustion it must be the *vishayatā-sambandha*. *Ghaṭa-jñānam* therefore means *vishayatayā ghaṭavad jñānam*, and similarly *jñāto ghaṭah* means *vishayatayā jñāna-viśiṣṭo ghaṭah*.

‡ The Mīmāṃsā holds that *jñatātā* is a quality in the object, the Nyāya that it is a *swarūpa-sambandha* between the *jñāna* and the object.

makes this cognition different from other cognitions;] and just as in common phrases about the objects of actions, as jars, &c., we have the particular meaning of the verbal root as that which distinguishes the particular phrase [and thus makes it differ from other similar phrases,]* so too in such alleged cases as 'the jar is cognized,' it is the cognition alone which distinguishes this particular knowledge in regard to the jar, and it is not from any other supposed attribute [as your 'cognizedness'].

V. "May we not, however, still maintain that God's knowledge is not properly 'right knowledge' (*pramā*) since it is not produced by proof (*pramāna*;) and therefore God can neither be a right knower (*pramātā*) Himself nor be a cause of right knowledge to us, since the essential conditions for both are absent in Him?" He replies,

V. Right knowledge is accurate comprehension and right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritative-ness is, according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all absence thereof.†

Right knowledge is a notion corresponding to the object; and this is not inconsistent with God's knowledge, even though His knowledge be not produced [but eternal]. 'Right knowing' [*i. e.* the being a right knower,] means the being connected with right knowledge by intimate relation, [*i. e.* that relation which connects a substance and its qualities;‡] and this can be established of God, even though He be not a cause of right knowledge to us. In the same way God is an authority as being Himself ever connected with right knowledge, *i. e.* as being ever 'separated from all absence thereof.' There is no need to include as absolutely necessary in your definition that He must be an instrument of right knowledge to others, since God's authoritativeness is thus declared in the Nyāya Sūtras, (II. 68.) "The fact of the Veda being an authority, [*i. e.* an instrument of right knowledge,] like the spells [against poison, &c.,]

* Thus in 'a jar is made,' 'a jar is broken, &c.,'—it is the verb which distinguishes the several sentences.

† *I. e.* there may be a partial *pramā* even in a case of error, (thus the jaundiced perception is right as to the *shell*, though wrong as to its colour;) but *pramānya* can never be found where there is any, even only a *partial*, absence of *pramā*.

‡ God is *pramāṇa-kartā*, *i. e.* *pramātā*, but *kartā* must not be taken in its usual meaning (as his knowledge is eternal,) but in that of *āśraya*.

and the medical science, follows from the authoritativeness of the fit person [who gave it"]. Nor need you object that this will lead to God's being a fifth cause of right knowledge, (*pramāṇa*) and thus our old division of four *pramāṇas* will be violated,—because our old division will still hold as applying to *instrumental* causes of right knowledge, [and the Veda, our fourth *pramāṇa*, is God's instrument]. Nor need you object that "God's knowledge [if He be omniscient] will embrace error [as well as truth,] and apprehend the objects of error [as well as those of truth,] and therefore will itself be liable to the imputation of error,"—since the nature of right knowledge is not violated so long as the knowledge is not associated with a contradictory object, [*i. e.* so long as I do not apprehend silver in what is not silver but nacre]. Now it is an actual fact that in error there is a definite object, as nacre, and also that it is viewed under the notion of silver; and God's right knowledge cannot be impaired by his apprehending this fact.

VI. He now gives a *s'loka* recapitulating the purport of the Chapter.

VI. He, in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in Him,—He, 'Siva, is my authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts?

"The succession of all the various existing objects"—*i. e.* all the world is the object of God's perception. "All possible faults," as partiality, aversion, &c. "All the chaff of our suspicion is swept away,"—all our suspicion as to the Veda's want of authority. "Others," *i. e.* heretics.

FIFTH CLUSTER.

I. The fifth objection was 'from the absence of positive proof.' "May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God's existence?" He replies,

I. From effects, combination, support, &c., traditional arts, authoritativeness, 'Śruti, the sentences thereof, and particular numbers,—an everlasting omniscient Being is to be established.

a. The earth, &c., must have had a maker because they have the nature of 'effects,'* like a jar; by a thing's having a maker we mean that it is produced by some agent who possesses the wish to make, and has also a perceptive knowledge of the material cause out of which it is to be made.† b. 'Combination' is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms, initiating the binary compound, at the beginning of a creation, must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being, because it has the nature of an action, like the actions of bodies such as ours. c. 'Support, &c.' The world depends upon some being who possesses a volition which hinders it from falling, because it has the nature of being supported, like a stick supported by a bird in the air; by being supported we mean the absence of falling in the case of bodies possessing weight. By the ' &c.,' we include destruction. Thus the world can be destroyed by a being possessed of volition, because it is destructible, like cloth which is rent. d. 'From traditional arts.' *Pada* [which is not used here in its usual sense of 'word,' see *infra* § v.] is derived from the root *pada*, i. e. 'that by

* This is proved because the world consists of parts which are arranged in a certain way and are severally produced and destroyed, (see *Sarva D. Sangraha*, p. 81, last line).

The argument from *Kāryatva* is really the same as that employed by Chalmers (in his *Natural Theology*,) to rebut Hume's objection to the *a posteriori* argument on the ground that the world is only a singular effect.

† Cf. *Bhāṣā Paricheheda*, § 149.

which something is known,' *i. e.* the traditional arts of mankind. The traditional arts now current, as that of making cloth, &c., must have been originated by an independent being,* from the very fact that they are traditional usages like the tradition of modern modes of writing† [invented by men independently, as systems of short-hand, &c.] *e.* 'From authoritativeness.' The knowledge produced by the Veda is produced by a virtue residing in its cause,‡ because it is right knowledge, just as is the case in the right knowledge produced by perception &c.§ *f.* 'From Śruti,' *i. e.* the Veda. The Veda must have been produced by a person from its having the nature of a Veda|| like the *Āyur-veda* (*i. e.* the *upaveda* so called, treating of medical science) *g.* Again, the Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of 'sentences,' like the *Mahābhārata*; or, in other words, the sentences of the Veda were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like ourselves. *h.* 'From particular numbers.' The measure of a binary compound is produced by number since it is a derived [*i. e.* not eternal] measure and at the same time is not produced by measure or aggregation,¶ like the measure of a jar composed of three *kapālas* which is larger than that of one composed of two such *kapālas* [and this increase can only be due to *number*, as the *kapālas* in themselves are all equal;] for the

* *Swatantratvam* is defined as *asmāditya-vyavahārānādhīna-vyavahāra-karitvam*.

† The Hindus hold that the Devanāgarī alphabet is of divine, while Bengali, Persian, &c. are of human, origin.—There is a current śloka of Bṛihaspati,

पाष्मासिकेऽपि विषये अग्निः सञ्जायते यतः ।
धात्राश्चराणि दृष्टानि पत्राह्वान्यतः पुरा ॥

‡ See Bhāṣhā P. §§ 130-3. Wrong knowledge or error is produced by a fault in its cause, as jaundice, &c. in the eye; and right knowledge is produced by a *guṇa* or virtue, (like Aristotle's *ὀφθαλμον ἀρετη* or *βελτιστη ἐξις*). This virtue in the case of the Veda is its quality of being uttered by a fit person, *i. e.* one possessing a true knowledge of words and meanings.

§ Some say that the *guṇa* here is the absence of jaundice, &c., others the direct contact of the organ with a true object.

|| By Nyāya Sū. ii. 68, we learn that 'that is Veda where the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is admitted.'

¶ Cf. Bhāṣhā P. § 110. The infinitesimality of atoms is eternal.

measure of an atom* does not produce measure because its measure is eternal [and therefore incapable of change] or because it is the measure of an atom. Hence at the beginning of a creation there must be the number of duality abiding in the atoms, which is the cause of the measure of the binary compound, but this number cannot be produced at that time by the distinguishing perception of beings like ourselves. Therefore we can only assume this distinguishing faculty as then existing in God.†—By the last words of the text it is meant that it is the Being, possessed of this attribute [of omniscience,] who is everlasting,‡ and hence is established his eternal omniscience.

II. “*a.* But may we not say that inasmuch as only one possessed of a body can be a maker, the existence of God is precluded as the distinguishing attribute of a maker is precluded? *b.* We have also the contrary syllogism, that we cannot allow the earth, &c. to have been produced by a maker, as there is the absence of the being produced by a body which invariably accompanies the being produced by a maker. *c.* There is also an opposing universal proposition, viz. that only one possessed of a body can be a maker. *d.* By the induction

* Ibid. § 14. The atoms of Hindu philosophy, being infinitesimal, would only produce still smaller totalities (like multiplied fractions or added negative quantities) as measure can only produce a further result homogenous with itself. It is the tertiary compound, which, as having finite magnitude (*mahattwa*,) produces measure, just as the jar's measure is caused by that of its two halves.

† To understand this argument, we must remember that the Nyāya holds that all number beyond unity is produced in things by an effort of our mind,—in nature all things exist *singly*, and it is we who combine them into sets of two, three, or more at our pleasure. The first operation is that distinguishing perception called *apekshābuddhi*, by which we say of each thing, ‘this is one,’ ‘this is one,’ &c. This produces duality, &c. in the objects, as e. g. in two jars, which duality resides by intimate relation in each of the objects, but resides in *both* by a peculiar connection called *parīdṛpti*—it is this last which gives the idea of “two pots,” and not merely that of one pot possessing duality here and another possessing it there. As the binary compound only differs from the atom by number and not by measure or size, (as both are, as far as we are concerned, alike infinitesimal, however one may be really larger than the other,) we must have recourse to the Supreme Being's *apekshābuddhi* to account for the existence of number in the binary compound at the time of creation. The smallest perceptible size is the tertiary compound, consisting of three binary ones. See Colebrooke, i. p. 278. It is singular that the Nyāya should adopt such a conceptualistic view of number, while it yet holds such realistic notions of genus.

‡ There are two kinds of *anvaya* or logical connection, *viśiṣṭa-vidhaya* and *upalakṣhaya vidhaya*. The former is where the epithet is emphatic and is therefore never disjoined from the subject; the latter is where the emphasis is laid on the subject and the epithet or predicate may be sometimes separated. (Thus Phidias the sculptor is not always actually sculpturing.) In the present case the epithet ‘everlasting’ belongs to the former class and can never be separated from its subject the Supreme Being as distinguished by the attribute of omniscience, and this attribute is therefore everlasting.

which extends over every case presented by experience [as jars, &c.,] we infer that a maker must have a body, but by the relation existing in the present argument between the minor term earth, &c. and the major term it would appear that the maker is incorporeal [as no maker is in this case perceptible]—hence the possibility of the alleged major term is unproved, and there is also a mutual contradiction between the subject, [maker,] and the attribute ascribed to it, [incorporeal.] *c.* We may also establish the fallacy of a too general middle term by inserting the condition§ “from being produced by a corporeal agent” instead of the old middle “from being an effect.” Thus there are five separate fallacies involved by the alleged middle term.” He replies,

II. There is no precluding, as this, [our middle term,] is indispensable ; nor are there any valid counterarguments, as those alleged are too weak ; whether our assumed connection be established or overthrown, there is no mutual contradiction ; nor can you have a too general middle term, without any reason for it.

a. Because the possession of a body is precluded in the case of the subject [sc. the Supreme Being,] it does not follow that his possession of the attribute of being a maker is precluded, since ‘this,’ *i. e.* our middle term (—“having the nature of an effect”—) which necessarily establishes the existence of the subject [as every effect implies a cause] is too powerful to be set aside, as it is this which must undoubtedly be looked to as producing the knowledge of the subject at all, and without the knowledge of the subject, as we have previously proved, [in III. § ii.] it is impossible to establish the knowledge of non-existence. And thus there is no such pretended perception as would preclude the existence of God because his distinguishing attribute as maker is precluded. Nor again is there any such precluding inference as “God cannot be a maker because he has no body,” [since in your opinion the very existence of God is unproved, and how then can you discuss his attributes ?]

b. We cannot admit as a valid opposing argument “the earth,

* For *Upálhi*, the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, see *supra*, p. 37.

&c. are destitute of a maker because they were not produced by a body," because your middle term is fallacious as assuming too much, since the words 'by a body' are superfluous.*

c. The middle term in our argument, "having the nature of an effect," is more valid than that of the opposite argument ["the earth, &c., are not produced by a maker from their not being produced by a body,"] because ours is supported by its being actually found as an attribute of the minor term [earth, &c.], and there is also an argument to stop any certain negative instance;† while on the other hand your alleged universal proposition "only one possessed of a body can be a maker," is too weak to stop us [as it is not found as an actual attribute of the minor term and there is moreover no such acknowledged principle.]

d. If by the connection existing between the minor and major terms it be established that the maker is incorporeal, then there is no contradiction, since in that case it is understood that being a maker may coexist with incorporeality; and, again, if it be not established, then, even in this case, there is no contradiction, [*i. e.* your alleged fault falls to the ground,] from the want of any subject in which it is to abide.

e. Since there *is* an argument on our side by which to preclude any certain negative instance, there cannot be here such an inconclusiveness as a mistake as to the major premiss caused by the absence of any such precluding argument, *i. e.* the fallacy of a too general middle term; and moreover your pretended 'condition,' "produced by a body"—is itself overthrown by the absence of any argument on *your* side to preclude a negative instance.‡

III. "But may we not bring forward the opposing argument, that 'if God were a maker he would have a body?' while at the same time there is no argument of equal weight to support your view." He replies,

* The older Naiyāyikas maintained that the argument "the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke" involved the fallacy of vyāpyatwāsiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted. See Siddhānta Muktv. p. 77. The moderns however more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet *b.* in the text by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term.

† *I. e.* wherever you have an effect, you must have a producing cause,—therefore you cannot have an effect without a maker.

‡ There are two readings here विपक्षबाधकाभावेन and विपक्षबाधकावतारेण. If we adopt the latter, it means "by the presence of an argument on our side to preclude a negative instance."

III. Our opponents' arguments, being defective, cannot invalidate our reasoning by their fallaciousness,—while the favourable argument from the abolition of effects tells on our side.

These opposing arguments are 'fallacious' because they are subjectless, so long as the existence of their subject, God, is itself unproved. But the argument "there could not be an effect without a causer," is 'on our side.' There is also S'ruti to prove it, "I am the origin of all, from me all proceeds."* And that S'ruti has pre-eminent force which is supported by reasoning, according to the verse, [of Manu,] "He, and none else, knows religion, who investigates the Veda and the religious teaching of the Rishis by means of such reasoning, as is not contrary to the Veda and the S'ástras."

IV. "But how does the fact of a thing's being an effect necessitate that it should have been produced by volition?" He replies,

IV. If it [the atom] acts independently, it ceases to be brute matter,—desert does not abolish visible causes; if there be no cause there is no effect; a particular effect has a particular cause.

There cannot be an effect without a causer. If the atom were endued with volition it would follow that the atom was intelligent, since an unintelligent thing can produce an effect only when impelled by an intelligent being; and desert [or fate] can only produce effects by the concurrence of visible causes.† Nor may you say that "the volition of the conscious agent is the cause in effort‡ only and not in all action generally," because even though a particular kind of volition may be the cause in the case of effort, this does not preclude volition generally as the cause of action generally; otherwise, because a particular seed is the cause of a particular shoot, it would follow that seeds in general [i. e. the class, seed] could not be the causes of shoots in general.§

* Bhagavad Gítá, x. 8.

† Otherwise all things would be produced by desert alone, and all other causes would be superfluous.

‡ There is a memorial verse, ज्ञानजन्या भवेदिच्छा इच्छाजन्या भवेत् कृतिः । कृतिजन्या भवेच्छेष्टा चेष्टाजन्या भवेत् क्रिया ॥ *Ichchhá is chakírshá, kṛiti is yatna or 'volition.'*

§ This argument depends on two principles,—a. the same relation of cause

V. "But what is the proof that support, &c. (§ i.) are produced by volition?" He replies,

V. In this way 'support' and 'destruction' require no limiting condition because they are effects; and the same thing holds of 'traditional arts' and 'authoritativeness, &c.' through an interruption [of the tradition].

'Support' and 'destruction' do not require any limiting condition [*i. e.* they are not too general middle terms,] because they are produced by volition [*i. e.* inasmuch as they are effects, they involve volition by § iv.] Since, through the interruption of the tradition,—*i. e.* through a partial destruction of the world [as of one loka,]—there is an absence of all patterns, &c. the succeeding copier cannot himself be the origin of the tradition since he does not know the tradition; hence is established the existence of some being who, at the beginning of a creation, originated the various traditional arts, as of making jars, &c.* In the same way we may prove that the authoritativeness of the ideas produced by the Veda, &c. are not too general middle terms, [Cf. § xvi. *infra*.]

VI. Or we may interpret the first couplet of this Chapter in the following manner.

a. 'Effect' may mean 'purport' [*i. e.* the 'effect' to be produced on the hearer's mind;] it has been said that words are authoritative only in reference to their purport, and therefore he is God whose purport is declared in the Veda.

b. 'Combination' may mean 'explanation;' the Vedas must have been explained by some one who knew their meaning, since their sentences have been received by great saints; and, if they had not been explained, these saints, not knowing their meaning, would not have fulfilled their injunctions by sacrifice, &c., and if a finite being had explained them, his explanation could not have been relied on.

and effect which exists between particulars exists likewise between their respective classes यद् विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावस्तत् सामान्ययोरपि and b. the general causes only produce their effects when conjoined with the particular causes, सामान्यसामग्रौ विशेषसामग्रौसहितैव कार्यं जनयति. Thus Archbishop Whately has made a book on Logic,—man can therefore make logical books; only in each particular case we require the concurrents, education, leisure, &c.

* See *supra*, p. 28. It is interesting to compare this with Isaiah xxviii. 26. Cf. also the Greek legend of Triptolemus, and Whately's Lectures on Pol. Economy, pp. 79, 84.

c. 'Support' may mean 'preserving the tradition.' The &c. may include 'performance.'

d. The existence of God is also established by the meaning of the 'words' I's'wara, &c.,* as has been said, "Denomination† is purport, the explanation of an all-seeing one is valid; the words I's'wara, &c. must have a meaning in accordance with the custom of mankind." 'Denomination' here implies a particular kind of wish. In the same way in such verses as "I am the origin of all" the word "I" means an independent utterer, since even in secular matters that word alone has authoritativeness which possesses a definite meaning; and in accordance with the rule, "he who knows secular things knows Vaidic also," the same rule holds in a transcendental subject which holds in the case of a secular 'I,' &c.

e. The word *pratyaya* which we formerly rendered 'authoritativeness' may also mean 'affix,' i. e. the affix of the imperative implying 'let' [as in 'let him sacrifice;'] the meaning of the command has been defined as 'the will of a fit person;' and *He* whose will it is, is God.‡

VI. Activity is really volition, (*yatna*,) and this springs from the desire to act, and this from knowledge, and the object of this knowledge is a command, or [as we would hold] it is rather that which causes a command to be inferred.

After the knowledge produced by a command arises 'activity;'§ and this activity springs directly from a certain wish, i. e. 'the desire to act;' and this desire arises from the 'knowledge' that the thing is to be accomplished by action and that it is the means to obtain the desired end [happiness]; and the object of this knowledge is the fact that the thing is to be done and is a means to our obtaining the desired end, i. e. the fact of its being a command. This was the opinion of the ancient Naiyāyikas; but he expresses his

* The &c. includes Om, &c.

† Colebrooke translates *uddes'a* by 'enunciation,'—"the mention of a thing by its name,—that is, by a term signifying it, as taught by revelation; for language is considered to have been revealed to man."

‡ This interpretation of *pratyaya* leads to a long and intricate discussion on *vidhi* which lasts to the end of § xiv. He goes on with his explanation of § i. in § xv.—The first question is, since *vidhi* is *pravartaka vākya*, what is *pravritti*?

§ *Prayatna* is divided into three kinds (Bhāṣā P. § 148,)—*pravritti*, *nivṛtti* and *jīvana-kāraṇa*, i. e. activity, cessation from activity, and vitality.

own in the last words of the couplet 'or rather it is that which causes a command to be inferred,' *i. e.* the real meaning of the tense affix expressing command is 'the will of a fit person,' which causes the hearer to infer that to act accordingly will be the means to obtain the desired end.

VII. He now proceeds to prove by exhaustion what is the object of that knowledge which causes that wish which produces activity, [*i. e.* he here shews what it is *not*, his own view will be given in § xiv.]

VII. [The various current notions of the meaning of 'command' are wrong; thus] it cannot be an attribute in the agent, either from improper exclusion and inclusion,—or because activity does not always ensue,—or from the ensuing inconsistency,—or from the non-existence of the action-producing wish,—or from the involved uselessness [as a cause] of the knowledge that such an action is a means,—or from confusion.

a. If you say that an attribute in the agent,—muscular action,—produces 'activity,' [and is therefore the meaning of 'command,'] then it would follow that in such a command as 'let him know the soul' we should properly have no activity at all, while, on the other hand, on hearing such an indicative sentence as 'he goes to the village' we should have activity produced in the hearer. *b.* If you say that the real meaning of 'command' is 'volition,' then follows the fault that activity does not always ensue; since, although volition is also implied by other tense signs than those of the potential and imperative, yet no activity follows if we do not ascertain that it is a means to a desired end, or if we know that it is a means to an undesired end.

c. If you say that 'wish' [*i. e.* the agent's, as in 'let him who desires swarga offer such a sacrifice'] is the proper meaning of 'command,' then you incur the fault of 'inconsistency.' If 'wish' be the meaning of 'command,' then on the one hand the knowledge of the wish [*i. e.* the knowledge of the command] can only be produced by the previously existing wish [as all knowledge depends on the prior existence of its object,]—while on the other hand the wish must be

produced by the knowledge of the wish,*—hence you reason in a circle,—which is called in the couplet, ‘inconsistency.’

d. But an opponent may reply that ‘the abovementioned knowledge of the wish [*i. e.* the mere knowledge of the wish itself as implied in the terms of the command ‘*swargakāmo yajeta*,’ this knowledge of the meaning not being accompanied by any *conscious wish* in the person’s own mind,] is produced by the tense affix,†—to this he replies, ‘from the non-existence of the action-producing wish.’ Even if the knowledge of such a wish be produced, yet no activity will ensue, as there is no such wish present as we defined in § vi. to be the cause of activity, since only such a wish can produce activity as is a cause by its own nature (and not simply from its being *known*),‡ and even on your own shewing there cannot be *such a wish* at the time of hearing the tense affix of the command, but only that knowledge of a wish which is produced by the spoken word. e. But it may be replied “is not this very wish produced by the tense affix of the command ‘*let him, &c.*?’” he replies, that the universally acknowledged cause, knowledge, will be overthrown. The knowledge that the action enjoined is a means to the desired end, which all accept as the cause of the wish, will be in danger of being overthrown, as the effect will be sometimes produced by the tense affix, even where this acknowledged cause is not found.

f. But some may say that ‘the meaning of the command is a wish [for the end] produced in the mind of the agent by a knowledge determined by happiness, &c. § (as the ultimate fruit to be desired) at the time of hearing the command,’—he replies, ‘this will cause confusion.’ All allow necessarily that the knowledge that the action is a means to the desired end is the cause of the wish for the means [*i. e.* the required action of sacrifice,] and as there is no other cause for

* I. e. you will have a consecutive series, 1, *ichchhā*; 2, *ichchhā-jñāna* or *vilki-jñāna*; 3, *ichchhā*. The second *ichchhā* is ‘the desire to act’ of § vi. which arose from the knowledge that such an action is commanded.—The true order is, 1. *ishṭa-sādhanatā-jñāna*; 2. *ichchhā*, (*upāyechchhā*;) 3. *pravṛtti*. He here proves that *vidhi* cannot mean the second; he subsequently shews that it cannot be the third. Udayana and the old Nyāya differ as to the first, see § xiii.

† I. e. by *S'abda*, not by *ichchhā*.

‡ There are two kinds of causes *swarūpa* sat and *jñāta*; an example of the former is ‘eating is the cause of satisfying hunger,’ of the latter ‘smoke is a cause of fire (being inferred).’

§ The &c., includes ‘absence of pain.’ The former fault will not apply here as this knowledge of the desire for the fruit *will* cause action,—if a man does not desire heaven, the command *Swargakāmo yajeta* is not a command to him.

this knowledge that the action is the means to the desired end, the tense sign of the command must be its cause;—hence the knowledge of the wish for the end is not a cause of activity, as activity can be found where it does not exist [if only the knowledge of the action's being a means to a desired end exist;] and hence there would be confusion of the two causes, because *your* cause 'the knowledge of the desire for the fruit' is always found accompanied by *my* cause, 'the knowledge that the action is a means to a desired end' [and as in certain cases mine is found where yours is not found, mine will be sufficient by itself and why then need we bring in yours at all?] The commentator adds another objection in the fact that as there is no proof that the knowledge of the wish for the fruit produces the wish for the means, [this being produced by the knowledge that the means will produce a desired end] it follows that the former cannot be the meaning conveyed by the tense affix of the command [because this meaning whatever it be, must necessitate action].

VIII. "Well, but why not say that the knowledge of volition [as implied in the potential used imperatively] is alone that which sets men in action, but that no tense-sign besides this does express volition, since all the other tense-signs express only an operation in accordance with the meaning of the root? For we find this the case in such instances as 'the chariot goes' [where we have an operation but no volition.]" He replies,

VIII. In consequence of the fixed rule about applying the term 'maker' drawn from the distinction between the use of the phrases 'made' and 'not made,' making or action means volition only; and that action which is causative in reference to a subsequent thing is the meaning of the tense-sign.

In accordance with such phrases as 'the pot is made,' 'the shoot is not made,' we may say that the potter, &c., are makers but not the other instrumental causes [as the wheel, &c.,] hence we may say that the meaning of the root *Kṛi* is making or action, [*i. e. kṛiti*, or volition.]"—"But if so, would not the words 'volition' and 'tense-sign,' be synonyms? [as all tense signs can be resolved into *kṛiti*, *i. e. yatna*.]" He replies by the last paragraph. That making or action, which is the means in reference to an actual sub-

sequent end, is the meaning of the tense-sign,—*i. e.* the meaning of the tense-sign is only a volition in accordance with the end. Or (according to another view) the meaning of the tense-sign is a volition which produces a repetition of the meaning of the root, in the form of successively repeated operations in accordance with the desired end, one following the other. In this way the tense-sign will have three meanings, volition, accordance with the root and successive repetition [while under the first view it will have only the two first; under either view, however, the tense-sign will involve more than simple volition and therefore cannot be its synonym].

IX. “But may we not allow that the root *Kṛi* may mean volition, and yet maintain that the tense-sign only means an operation in accordance with the root, the volition being only understood by an inference?”* He replies,

IX. The meaning of the tense-sign is a volition and this applies to all tense-signs equally; since by it all can be clearly developed, and since the alleged inference cannot be established.

As by ‘it,’—*i. e.* making, or the word which expresses making (*karoti*) the meaning of the tense-sign is developed at length, as in *pākam karoti*, ‘he makes cooking’ for *pachati*, ‘he cooks,’—we must have ‘making,’ *i. e.* volition, as the meaning of the tense-sign; [and again your supposed inference fails] since an operation in accordance with the root does not always imply a volition, as an operation in accordance with the root ‘cook’ in the present case can be found even in an unintelligent thing [as in the wood, fire, pot, &c., where of course there can be no volition.]

“But, if so, why on hearing the objective case ‘boiled rice,’ do we naturally require the sentence to be filled up by ‘he cooks’ or ‘he eats?’ [On *my* hypothesis it is easily explained, as I maintain that all tense-signs imply an operation in accordance with the root’s meaning, and from this we can infer volition in this instance; but on your hypothesis, it is not so obvious.”] This can be explained, in our view, by the fact that an objective case is invariably accompanied by a volition [expressed by the tense-sign,] just as on the other hand

* The inference will be in this form—wherever there is no volition there is no operation in accordance with the root.

on hearing the verb 'he cooks,' we naturally require the sentence to be filled up by some object.

X. "But since by developing the full meaning we do obtain an agent (as in 'he makes cooking' for 'he cooks') why should we not say that the tense-sign signifies also an agent?" He replies,

X. We must not suppose that the tense-sign directly signifies [an agent,] as this which is connected with number can be obtained by inference; and in the obtaining of that which is connected with number, the rule holds for that only which has expectancy.

We must not suppose that the tense-sign signifies an agent, since this 'agent' is gained by an inference from the number expressed by the tense-sign. What we mean by 'being gained by an inference' is that something is qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign, while at the same time it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case. We use the former phrase 'qualified by the meaning of the tense-sign' to exclude such ambiguous cases as 'having eaten Devadatta goes away,' &c.,* and we use the latter phrase 'while at the same time, it is expressed by a word ending in the nominative case,' because in such instances as 'it is slept by Devadatta,' &c., it is the meaning of the root, 'sleep,' which is qualified by present time, as implied in the tense-sign [and verbal roots have no cases.] [Nor may we say that the object is connected with the tense-sign as well as the subject,—because] in such phrases as 'Chaitra cooks rice,' &c. since the meaning 'rice' is already connected with the idea of object as implied in the objective case, we are not to suppose that there is any further dependence (as of expectancy) on the volition expressed by the tense-sign; hence the tense-sign is connected with the meaning of the crude form as expressed in the unmodified† 'casus rectus.' Hence in accordance with the rule that 'the number [of the tense] is connect-

* Here Devadatta is qualified by number and volition through the meaning of the tense-sign, *i. e.* *Devadatta ekatvavān kṛitvānscha*; but *bhuktvā* is not thus qualified,—it itself is an adverb and qualifies the verb. According to Hindu grammar the adverbial suffix *tvā* involves the elision of the nominative affix (cf. Pāṇ. 2, 4, 82) and therefore the second part of the definition would apply, but not the former.

† *I. e.* Non-oblique case, *i. e.* not a *kāraka*. *शुद्ध* means here *rectus*; there is a Sūtra *उक्तात्तु औ जसः* | 'The signs of the Nominative case are used after a word which is the subject of a verb.'—The 'casus rectus' will be *Chaitras* in the *Kartrivādehya* sentence, and *tanḍulam* in the *Karmavādehya*.

ed with that with which the volition implied by the tense-sign is connected,'—since this follows because this volition and number are expressed by the same tense sign,—the nominative case is employed only where the number of the agent, &c.,* are already signified by the tense-sign. And in the same way the object cannot be said to be directly signified by the tense-sign.†

XI. "Well, but," say the Mīmāṃsakas, "may not the command be the attribute of the object?" He replies,

XI. The object cannot be the meaning of the command because it would apply too far; nor can the produced desert (*apūrva*) since it would lose its very nature; nor can an especial effect, since it is not always found present; nor, also, can the act, since men do not necessarily engage in the performance.

a. If you say that the objects [of the sacrifice] are heaven, &c.,‡ and the meaning of the command is an attribute in *them*, i. e. the fact of their having to be produced,—it is answered 'the object cannot be the meaning of the command because it would apply too far,'—since, if, as you say, the attribute of their having to be produced resides in heaven, &c., it would follow that a person possessing this knowledge might engage in any other action than sacrifice [as eating, &c., since 'the having to be produced or accomplished' resides, according to your opinion, in the *object* and not in the *act*.]

* I. e. the agent *Kartá* in most sentences, and the object *Karma* in such as 'the prize is gained by Devadatta.' As in the sentence 'Devadatta goes' the tense-sign signifies the volition (*kṛiti*) and not the agent, but by the connection we gain the latter, so in the sentence "the prize is gained by Devadatta" the tense-sign equally signifies the volition, and by the connection we gain the object.

† In the sentence *Chaitras taṇḍulam pachati*, *taṇḍula* means simply 'rice' and is connected with the affix *am* which signifies that *taṇḍula* in the singular number is the object; this *am* is connected with the root *pacha* which means 'cooking'; *pacha* is connected with the affix *tip* which means 1, *vartamāna-kāla*, 2, *yatna*, 3, *sankhyā*. The present time as implied by *tip* is connected with *yatna*, and *yatna* and *sankhyā* are connected with the *kartá* *Chaitra*. In the sentence *Chaitrena taṇḍulam pachyate*, the same process can be traced; *chaitra* is connected with the affix *id*, *id* with the root *pacha*, *pacha* with the affix *te*, and *te* as before with *taṇḍulam*. The grammarians maintain that in the former case the real meaning of the verbal affix is directly *Kartá*, in the latter *Karma*; the Nyāya maintains that in both cases it is *yatna* (sc. *Kṛiti*), but indirectly by *anvaya* it may be respectively *Kartá* or *Karma*.

‡ As in such commands as "let him who desires heaven offer the *jyotishṭoma* sacrifice," &c.—The opponent maintains that their real meaning is, "heaven is to be produced," *swargah kāryah*, but not 'the sacrifice is to be performed.'

b. If you say that the 'object' means *apúrva*,* and that the meaning of the command is an attribute in it, *i. e.* the fact of its having to be produced,† then it is answered, 'it would lose its very nature ;' for the very word *apúrva* [as compounded of a 'not' and *púrva* 'previously existing'] implies that it was not known before the verbal knowledge was produced by hearing the command ; and if it is known before [as it must be, if the words of the command are to imply it,]‡ then it would cease to be *apúrva* at all ; and, on the other hand, if it is not known before, then how can you have any knowledge of the meaning of the tense-sign in the command, and consequently how can you have any verbal knowledge of *apúrva* produced by this tense-sign ?

c. If the Mīmāṃsaka replies, 'why should there not be a previous knowledge that *apúrva* is the meaning of the command, so far as regards its *general* character as a thing to be produced,—but when the verbal knowledge is gained, then in consequence of the compatibility§ there arises a knowledge of *apúrva* as an *especial* thing to be produced,' to this it is answered, 'because we do not always find this especial *apúrva* present,' *i. e.* it would follow that there is no *apúrva*|| in necessary observances [as the morning and evening prayer, &c.,] or in absolute prohibitions [as that from injuring living creatures,] since we find no persons enjoined to perform them as they desire certain fruit to ensue [which fruit is to be attained by the produced *apúrva* as the means,—and consequently the tense-sign as in *má hin-syát* becomes meaningless.]

d. Or we may take this third sentence of the original in a different sense as follows. An objector might say, "but why might we not hold that we recognise that the word means a particular *apúrva*

* The unseen efficacy which arises from the sacrifice cf, p. 10.

† In this view the meaning of the command will be 'by him who desires heaven, the merit which is the cause of its attainment, is to be produced by the jyotishtoma sacrifice.'

‡ 'The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary, for if the power of a word be not apprehended previously, there could not be any recollection,—since this depends upon that relation called 'power' (*i. e.* the connection between a word and its meaning),—even though the word might be heard' (Siddh. Mukh. p. 79.) The knowledge of the connection between a word and its meaning is the cause of the meaning's being recollected when the word is heard, and from this recollection ensues verbal knowledge.

§ Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the three causes, or rather necessary conditions, of verbal knowledge, see *supra*, p. 43.

|| See Dr. Hall's Refutation of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 22—24.

*accompanied (though not necessarily so) by being an effect, just as the word 'earth' means a something necessarily distinguished by possessing a certain nature but not necessarily accompanied by the attribute of smell?" To this it is answered "because we do not find it so," *i. e.* because we cannot so know an *apúrva* distinguished by the character of *apúrvatva*. It is possible for the substance possessed of the special nature of earth to be known to possess smell, by means of memory or inference from a previous perception; but such a supposition is precluded in the present case by the very name *apúrva*, which implies an absence of any previous perception, and which would therefore be rendered nugatory.

e. "Well, why not take the sacrifice as the 'object,'† and then the meaning of the command will be an attribute of it, *i. e.* the fact of its having to be performed?" To this it is answered in the last words of the original verse. Your view cannot hold, since we do not see that men engage in the performance of the sacrifice, if there be present in their minds the idea that it will be only a means of trouble and expense, [while on your view the simple fact of their knowing it to be a command that 'by him who desires heaven the *jyotishṭoma* sacrifice is to be performed' should impel them irresistibly to the performance thereof.]—The word '*also*' implies that the object cannot mean '*apúrva*,' since the very same objection will hold as in the previous supposition of 'the sacrifice.'

XII. "But may we not say that words are the instrument of verbal knowledge, and that the enforcing power is an attribute residing in them,‡ and that the knowledge thereof incites men to engage in the enjoined rites;—hence it is said, 'the tense-signs such as the imperative, &c., express a *special* signification *i. e.* an enjoining power, while the common signification of all the tense-signs is an effort of the agent in accordance with the meaning of the root.' There arises from the tense affix of the imperative the idea of an enforcing power, setting a man to perform the enjoined sacrifice;

* For *upalakshita* see note ‡ in p. 66.

† Under this view the real meaning of the command will be 'by him who desires heaven the *jyotishṭoma* sacrifice is to be performed.'

‡ According to the *Mīmāṃsā*, *bhāvanā* resides in the agent as a volition (*yatna*) to perform some act to attain a desired end, and it may be expressed by any tense-sign; but it resides in the eternal Veda as an enjoining power (*prerana*), the end of which is the production of the former volition of the hearer,—this is only expressed by the imperative or potential.

b. If you say that the 'object' means *apúrva*,* and that the meaning of the command is an attribute in it, *i. e.* the fact of its having to be produced,† then it is answered, 'it would lose its very nature;' for the very word *apúrva* [as compounded of a 'not' and *púrva* 'previously existing'] implies that it was not known before the verbal knowledge was produced by hearing the command; and if it is known before [as it must be, if the words of the command are to imply it,]‡ then it would cease to be *apúrva* at all; and, on the other hand, if it is not known before, then how can you have any knowledge of the meaning of the tense-sign in the command, and consequently how can you have any verbal knowledge of *apúrva* produced by this tense-sign?

c. If the Mímánsaka replies, 'why should there not be a previous knowledge that *apúrva* is the meaning of the command, so far as regards its *general* character as a thing to be produced,—but when the verbal knowledge is gained, then in consequence of the compatibility§ there arises a knowledge of *apúrva* as an *especial* thing to be produced,' to this it is answered, 'because we do not always find this especial *apúrva* present,' *i. e.* it would follow that there is no *apúrva*|| in necessary observances [as the morning and evening prayer, &c.,] or in absolute prohibitions [as that from injuring living creatures,] since we find no persons enjoined to perform them as they desire certain fruit to ensue [which fruit is to be attained by the produced *apúrva* as the means,—and consequently the tense-sign as in *má hin-syát* becomes meaningless.]

d. Or we may take this third sentence of the original in a different sense as follows. An objector might say, "but why might we not hold that we recognise that the word means a particular *apúrva*

* The unseen efficacy which arises from the sacrifice cf. p. 10.

† In this view the meaning of the command will be 'by him who desires heaven, the merit which is the cause of its attainment, is to be produced by the jyotishtoma sacrifice.'

‡ 'The knowledge of the power of a word is necessary, for if the power of a word be not apprehended previously, there could not be any recollection,—since this depends upon that relation called 'power' (*i. e.* the connection between a word and its meaning),—even though the word might be heard' (Siddh. Mukh. p. 79.) The knowledge of the connection between a word and its meaning is the cause of the meaning's being recollected when the word is heard, and from this recollection ensues verbal knowledge.

§ Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are the three causes, or rather necessary conditions, of verbal knowledge, see *supra*, p. 43.

|| See Dr. Hall's Refutation of Hindu Philosophy, pp. 22—24.

*accompanied (though not necessarily so) by being an effect, just as the word 'earth' means a something necessarily distinguished by possessing a certain nature but not necessarily accompanied by the attribute of smell?" To this it is answered "because we do not find it so," *i. e.* because we cannot so know an *apúrva* distinguished by the character of *apúrvatva*. It is possible for the substance possessed of the special nature of earth to be known to possess smell, by means of memory or inference from a previous perception; but such a supposition is precluded in the present case by the very name *apúrva*, which implies an absence of any previous perception, and which would therefore be rendered nugatory.

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while the general meaning of all the tense-signs is an effort tending to the production of a certain action [thus *Devadatto gacchhati* means that 'Devadatta is possessed of a volition tending to produce going.'"] He replies,

XII. This enforcing power of the imperative, &c., is not to be maintained, since it cannot be proved, and since men do not engage in the performance, even though they know of the existence of this presumed enforcing power, [*i. e.* unless they have also the knowledge that it will be a means of procuring their wishes;] and again exhaustion is difficult to rest upon, as contradiction equally applies to this view, as well as to the others.

If you object that as every other meaning of the imperative tense-sign is excluded, it follows by exhaustion that this enforcing power must be its meaning, he replies that the contradiction equally applies to this opinion, as well as to the others, [as action does not necessarily follow from the knowledge of it.]

XIII. "But," says the Naiyāyika, "why should not the meaning of the command be the fact that the rite is a means to a desired end,—this residing as an attribute in the instrument, the sacrifice?"* He replies,

XIII. [This cannot be] because it is sometimes given as the reason for the command; because the command may be inferred therefrom; from the absence of this meaning in the second and third persons [of the imperative]; from its recognition in other meanings; and because on this view prohibition could not be established.

a. Because the fact of its being the means to the attainment of a desired object is often alleged by the speaker as proving the meaning of the command; and as a thing cannot be *its own* proof [it follows that the fact of its being a means to a desired object cannot be the meaning of the command]. Thus when it is said as a secu-

* The old Nyāya maintained the meaning of *vidhi* to be इष्टसाधनत्वं कार्यत्वञ्च. Udayana maintains it to be आप्तवृत्तिसिन्धुः. The modern Nyāya (*i. e.* Siddhānta Mukti.) gives बलवद्निष्ठाननुबन्धोऽसाधनत्वं

lar command, 'let him who desires fire rub two pieces of *aruni* wood together,' if you ask 'why?' the utterer of the command replies, 'because the rubbing two pieces of wood together is a means of producing fire.'

b. Another reason against your view is—because a command may be inferred even *after* the knowledge that the action is a means to the desired end has been produced by the *arthavāda* [or supplementary passage explaining the purpose of the command];—but if by the command which is thus inferred we were only to understand the fact that the action in question is a means to the desired end, then this inference would be wholly superfluous. Thus on hearing the S'ruti 'he crosses over death, he crosses over Brahmanicide [who offers the As'wamedha'], all the systems allow that there arises the inference of a command in such a form as 'let him who desires to cross over death and Brahmanicide, offer the As'wamedha.'

c. "From the absence of this meaning [*i. e.* its being a means to the desired end,] in the second and third* persons of the potential used imperatively;" in such phrases as 'you should do it' and 'let me do it' an injunction, or wish is implied [but not the fact of its being a means to a desired end,]—injunction means here the wish of the speaker; and consequently we may conclude that the first person also only means the wish of the speaker [and not the fact of the action being a means to the desired end.]

d. "From the fact that this meaning of 'wish' is acknowledged in the other meanings of the potential," as for instance in its meaning of 'respectful solicitation.'†

e. "Because on this view prohibition could not be established." Thus in the injunction "let him not eat the *Kalanja*,"‡ you cannot maintain that it is *not* the means to a desired end [as of course the eating will produce its proper pleasure.] Nor can you say [with the modern school,] that the meaning of the command is that the action is not accompanied by a predominant undesirable result, because this will not apply to such cases as 'let him who desires

* In Hindu grammar the third person corresponds to our first.

† अद्येषण is the अधीष्ट of Pāṇini (3, 3, 161). The Sankshipta Sāra explains it by सत्कारपूर्वकं गुरोर्निधेयजनं as भवान् पुत्रसंस्थापयेत्।

‡ Some hold the *Kalanja* to be the flesh of a deer killed by a poisoned arrow—others hemp or blang,—others a kind of garlic. See Raghunandana's *Ekādas'ī tattwa*.

to kill his enemy by incantation offer a hawk' [because this rite produces hell as its fruit]. And [if you say that in the case of the offerer, hell is not considered by *him* as a predominant undesirable result, since he still performs the ceremony, I reply that this does not hold, as] you cannot maintain that the sacrifice *generally* does not produce a result which the mass of mankind regard with predominant aversion, because the man who does *not* perform the sacrifice certainly has this predominant aversion which restrains him from yielding to the temptation of the gratification of a present revenge at the risk of a future torment in hell.

XIV. [After this lengthened discussion of the various current opinions on the nature of *vidhi* or command,] the author now proceeds to deliver his own.

XIV. The primary meaning of the potential used imperatively, &c., is the will of the speaker in the form of a command enjoining activity or cessation therefrom; while we conclude by inference that it is the means to a desired end for the doer.

The will of a fit person, *i. e.* God, having for its object engagement in the performance of an act [*i. e.* as in command] or refraining therefrom, [*i. e.* as in prohibition,] is the primary meaning of the affixes of the potential, &c.; and from these is to be inferred [see § vi.] that it is the means to obtain a desired end, [and hence the existence of 'command' proves the existence of a commander, God].

But the commentator here adds as a remark, that this view of Udayanáchárya is untenable, as by it you could not properly have prohibition at all, since every action of every kind is in one sense the object of God's will, [*i. e.* nothing, whether good or evil, takes place without his will]. If you reply that 'command' is 'God's will,' meaning by 'will' such a will as is unaccompanied by any predominant undesirable result, we object that the definition becomes needlessly complicated; and the old Naiyáyika opinion of § xiii. is after all the best.*

* Udayana gives as his definition of 'command' the 'will of a fit person,' *i. e.* God. It is replied that this will include too much as even evil actions are in one sense done with God's will. The definition is then corrected to 'such a will as is unproductive of any predominant undesirable result,'—in this view we may allow God's will in the case of an evil action, but here we shall not have *vidhi*, 'command,'—as it is such a will of God as produces hell to the doer.—The com.

XV. He now [resumes the interpretation of the first S'lōka, interrupted by the late discussion on *vidhi* §§ vi.—xiv. and] proceeds to give the second meaning of 'S'ruti.'

XV. All the Veda refers to the Supreme Being as its object; only, by means of its own primary meaning, like the words 'heaven,' &c., can it refer to a command.

In every part of the Veda is God's existence established, as for instance in such passages as, 'Vishṇu verily is the sacrifice' (*passim*), 'he sees without eyes,' (Swet. Up. iii. 19) 'by the command of this (previously mentioned) indestructible being, O Gárgi, heaven and earth stay upheld in their places, (Bṛihadár. Up. iii. 8, 9.) Nor may you say with the Mīmáṃsá, that 'these passages, being declaratory or indicative* [and not expressed in the potential or imperative, as commands are,] refer to something else, *i. e.* a command elsewhere expressed,' [or in other words they are the *arthaváda* of a previous *vidhi*],—because even according to your own opinion, these passages about God do possess an authority to establish the existence of their primary meaning, from their agreeing with such positive commands as 'let him adore God,' just as the passages declarative of heaven, hell, &c., [establish the objects which they primarily mean, because they are connected with such positive commands, as 'let him who desires heaven offer such a sacrifice,']—otherwise the very words 'heaven,' 'hell,' &c., would have no authority to establish their own primary significations. Hence he adds the latter line of the S'lōka, since it is only by establishing its own primary meaning that a declaratory passage can be said to agree with a command.

[The commentator now proceeds to give a second explanation of 'the sentences thereof' in § i.] The 'sentences thereof,'—*i. e.* the sentences of the Veda, expressing praise and blame,—must have been preceded, in the speaker's mind, by the knowledge of praise and blame, from the very fact that they are sentences which express

mentator objects to this as needlessly complicated; but it is not uninteresting to find the same thought in Anselm's 'cur Deus homo?' "although man or an evil angel be unwilling to submit to the will and ordinance of God, yet he cannot escape from it, because if he will flee from the will of God commanding him, he comes under the will of God punishing him."

* According to the Mīmáṃsá those passages which are not *vidhi* are *siddha* as opposed to *sādhya*; they describe something past or present (*svarūpakathanam*), while the *vidhi* relates to something future which is to be performed.

praise and blame, like such a secular sentence as 'the mango fruit is very sweet when ripe,' [as none could say this with authority unless he possessed previous knowledge thereof].

XVI. He now gives a second explanation of 'particular number' in § i.

XVI. In such phrases as 'let me be,' 'I was,' 'I will be,' &c., the number belongs to a speaker; nor could there be the current names of the 'Sákhás, without a primal utterance.

a. The first person singular as used in the Veda declares the 'number' of an independent speaker,—there being many such instances, as in the passage* "It reflected, 'let me, the one, become many,' " &c.

b. He now gives a third meaning of the word *sankhyá*, as making it the same as another derivative from the same root, *samākhya*, 'name, fame,'—"nor could there be &c." There are traditional names, in the Veda, of all the various 'Sákhás (or current recensions,) as Kāthaka or that belonging to Kāṭha, Kālāpa or that belonging to Kālāpa, &c.; nor can we explain this on the hypothesis† that these men first read that particular recension only, [others having before then read many or all,] since the number of readers is endless and in the eternal succession others besides these mentioned may well be supposed to have read those 'Sákhás only, [and why then were not the 'Sákhás called by their names?] Therefore we are driven to the belief that the adorable Supreme Being, seeing all supersensuous objects and possessed of boundless compassion, did at the beginning of each creation assume a particular body belonging to Kāṭha, Kālāpa, &c. which body was moved by the merit of beings like ourselves,‡ and the 'Sákhás which He thus uttered were severally called by these particular names.

* The two old MSS. read this quotation as I have printed it. Some copies read स for तत् but none have the usual reading found in Chhánd. Up. vi. 2.

† Cf. 'Sabara's Comm. on Jaimini, i. 1, 30.

‡ The final cause of God's assuming these bodies was to render possible the happiness due to the merit of men like ourselves,—*adṛishṭa* is an impelling cause of every thing down to the junction of two atoms, see Muktāvali, pp. 104, 105.

Thus have we established that it is the contemplation of God, which is the true means of liberation, (see I. ii.)

XVII. He now adds a couplet in reference to those who believe not in God.

XVII. Iron-souled are they in whose hearts Thou canst find no place, though thus washed by the repeated inundations of ethics and Vaidic texts; yet still in time, Oh merciful one, Thou in thy goodness canst save even those who oppose our proposition, and make them undoubting in their conviction of Thy existence.

XVIII. But as for us, O Thou essentially Fair, though our minds have been long plunged in Thee, the ocean of joy,* yet are they verily restless still and unsatisfied; therefore, oh Lord, haste to display Thy mercy, that our minds fixed only on Thee, we may no more be subject to Yama's continual inflictions.

XIX. This garland of flowers of ethics, radiant in its beauty,—what matters it, whether it perfumes the right and left hand† or not?—only may the Guru of Indra's Guru‡ be pleased by my presenting it as an offering at his footstool.

* For *ādhā* explained as *tattvam*, see 'Sis'upāla-badha, iii. 42, schol.

† Or 'the sapaksha and vipaksha of my argument.'

‡ 'Siva, as the guru of Brihaspati. Brihaspati is represented as the guru of Indra in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, VII. 28.

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